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SAFE INJECTION SITES AND THE 
FEDERAL “CRACK HOUSE” STATUTE 
ALEX KREIT* 
Abstract: Safe injection sites have become the next battlefield in the conflict 
between state and federal drug laws. A safe injection site is a place where in-
jection drug users can self-administer drugs in a controlled environment under 
medical supervision. They have been operating in other countries, including 
Canada, for decades, and a wealth of evidence suggests that they can help to 
reduce overdose deaths. To date, however, no United States city or state has 
sanctioned a safe injection site. Until recently, safe injection sites were politi-
cally untenable, seen as a form of surrender in the war on drugs. This dynam-
ic, however, has changed over the past few years. Prominent politicians from 
across the political spectrum have called for an end to the drug war, and the 
opioid epidemic has grown increasingly dire. Efforts to start safe injection 
sites are currently underway in at least thirteen United States cities and states. 
Five cities—Denver, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco, and Seattle—
have gone so far as to announce plans to open an injection site. There is just 
one small problem: the site proposals appear to violate the federal crack house 
statute, which makes it a crime to maintain drug-involved premises. The De-
partment of Justice has not yet taken a formal position on safe injection sites, 
but in a New York Times editorial, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein 
threatened that “cities and states should expect the Department of Justice to 
meet the opening of any injection site with swift and aggressive action.” Sur-
prisingly, this looming conflict has gone almost entirely overlooked by legal 
academics. Meanwhile, the public debate has assumed that safe injection sites 
are clearly forbidden by federal law. This Article argues that assumption is 
wrong. Despite the crack house statute, an obscure provision of the federal 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA) might allow states and localities to establish 
government-run safe injection sites. Buried in the CSA is a provision that im-
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munizes state and local officials who violate federal drug laws in the course of 
“the enforcement of any law or municipal ordinance relating to controlled 
substances.” This provision was almost surely intended to protect state and lo-
cal police officers that possess and distribute drugs in connection with under-
cover operations. Nevertheless, this Article argues, the text of the immunity 
provision and the scarce case law interpreting it suggest it could shield gov-
ernment-run safe injection sites from federal interference. 
INTRODUCTION 
The first government-sanctioned safe injection site opened in Berne, 
Switzerland in 1986.1 In the years since, approximately one hundred safe 
injection sites have been established in ten countries, including Canada, but 
not the United States.2 This may soon change, at least if the choice is left up 
to local decision makers. As of July 2018, there were at least thirteen U.S. 
cities and states beginning efforts to open supervised injection sites.3 In 
February 2018, the director of San Francisco’s Department of Public Health 
announced that the city hoped to become the first in the nation to permit 
safe injection facilities, with plans to have two open around the beginning 
of July 2018.4 When July 2018 came, however, the city backed away from 
its original plan. Instead, it opened a non-operational prototype facility for 
four days in late August as an exhibition for interested community mem-
bers.5  
                                                                                                                 
 1 Drug Consumption Rooms: An Overview of Provision and Evidence, EUR. MONITORING CTR. 
FOR DRUGS & DRUG ADDICTION (July 6, 2018), http://www.emcdda.europa.eu/attachements.cfm/
att_239692_EN_Drug%20consumption%20rooms_update%202016.pdf [https://perma.cc/XK7Z-
KKK6]. 
 2 Alex H. Kral & Peter J. Davidson, Addressing the Nation’s Opioid Epidemic: Lessons from 
an Unsanctioned Supervised Injection Site in the U.S., 53 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 919, 919 
(2017) (reporting that approximately ninety-eight supervised injection sites are currently operating 
in sixty cities in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, and Switzerland). Although no U.S. city has permitted safe injection sites, at least 
one unsanctioned facility has been operating in “an undisclosed urban area” in the United States 
since September 2014. Id. 
 3 Bobby Allyn, Cities Planning Supervised Drug Injection Sites Fear Justice Department 
Reaction, NPR (July 12, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/07/12/628136694/
harm-reduction-movement-hits-obstacles [https://perma.cc/WM6C-37SX]. 
 4 Heather Knight, SF Safe Injection Sites Expected to Be First in Nation, Open Around July 1, 
S.F. CHRON., (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/news/article/SF-safe-injection-sites-
expected-to-be-first-in-12553616.php [https://perma.cc/5TH8-FHJD]. 
 5 Laura Waxmann, Mock Safe Injection Site Opens in SF Amid Threat of Federal Prosecu-
tion, S.F. EXAMINER (Aug. 29, 2018), http://www.sfexaminer.com/mock-safe-injection-site-
opens-sf-amid-threat-federal-prosecution/ [https://perma.cc/CZ2D-K8MG]. Safe injection sites are 
referred to by a number of different names, including supervised injection facilities, safer con-
sumption services, and overdose prevention sites. This Article uses these terms interchangeably. 
See generally, Colleen L. Barry et al., Language Matters in Combatting the Opioid Epidemic: Safe 
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Safe injection sites are places where individuals can safely use their 
own drugs under the supervision of trained professionals.6 They are a harm 
reduction measure, aimed at allowing people to use drugs safely and reduc-
ing public disturbances caused by people using drugs on the streets or in 
public bathrooms.7 A wealth of evidence suggests that, if properly imple-
mented, safe injection facilities succeed in achieving these goals. Safe injec-
tion sites have been shown to reduce overdose deaths, increase participation 
in drug treatment programs, and lessen injection drug use in public.8 
Despite strong empirical support for safe injection facilities, U.S. poli-
cymakers have traditionally been resistant to them. Like many other public 
health-oriented drug strategies—from needle exchange to heroin-assisted 
treatment9—safe injection sites were long considered to be off-limits in the 
United States simply because they were incompatible with the war on 
drugs.10 Through the lens of the drug war, these sort of harm reduction 
measures were seen as a “form[] of surrender”11 and rejected out of hand. The 
dynamic has begun to change over the past decade, however, as a number of 
prominent politicians from across the political spectrum have called for an 
end to the war on drugs.12 At the same time, the opioid epidemic has grown 
increasingly dire. With more than 52,000 drug overdose deaths in 2015—up 
over 300% since 2000—our country is arguably “in the worst drug-related 
crisis in its history.”13 
This convergence of events has led, somewhat suddenly, to serious ef-
forts in a number of U.S. cities to establish safe injection facilities. Less 
than one month before San Francisco announced its intention to become the 
first city with a safe injection site, officials in Philadelphia gave the go-
                                                                                                                           
Consumption Sites Versus Overdose Prevention Sites, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 156 (2018) (dis-
cussing the lack of uniformity about the names used to refer to these sites). 
 6 Kral & Davidson, supra note 2, at 919. 
 7 Id. 
 8 See infra notes 32–51 and accompanying text (providing an overview of empirical evalua-
tions of safe injection sites). 
9 For an overview of needle exchange programs (also called syringe exchange programs), see 
generally Steven R. Salbu, Needle Exchange, HIV Transmission, and Illegal Drug Use: Informing 
Law and Public Policy with Science and Rational Discourse, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 105 (1996). 
For an overview of heroin-assisted treatment, see, for example, Dan Werb, Heroin Prescription, 
HIV, and Drug Policy: Emerging Regulatory Frameworks, 91 OR. L. REV. 1213 (2013). 
 10 See Alex Kreit, Drug Truce, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1323, 1336–37 (2016) (discussing the impact 
of drug war politics on the pursuit of harm reduction measures in the United States). 
 11 William J. Bennett, The Drug War Worked Once; It Can Again, WALL STREET J. (May 15, 
2001), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB989884118310019941 [https://perma.cc/EP6V-34PA]. 
 12 Kreit, supra note 10, at 1324–26. 
 13 Leo Beletsky & Corey S. Davis, Today’s Fentanyl Crisis: Prohibition’s Iron Law, Revisit-
ed, 46 INT’L J. DRUG. POL’Y 156, 156 (2017). 
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ahead to open a facility.14 In late 2017, the Seattle City Council passed a 
budget that included $1.3 million for a safe injection site.15 Other locales 
that are considering permitting safe injection sites include Boston, Denver, 
New York City, and the State of Vermont.16 
With so many interested cities, it seems like only a matter of time be-
fore government-sanctioned safe injection sites are open in the United 
States. There is just one small problem: they appear to violate federal law. 
Because safe injection site operators do not handle drugs themselves, it 
is unlikely the facilities would run afoul of federal laws criminalizing drug 
possession and distribution.17 But they would almost certainly violate the 
so-called federal crack house statute. Passed in the mid-1980s, the crack 
house statute makes it a crime to make property available to others “for the 
purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a con-
trolled substance.”18 Because safe injection site clients would be at the 
property for the purpose of using illegal drugs, facility operators—including 
                                                                                                                 
 14 Elana Gordon, What’s Next for ‘Safe Injection’ Sites in Philadelphia?, NPR (Jan. 24, 2018), 
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2018/01/24/580255140/whats-next-for-safe-injection-sites-
in-philadelphia [https://perma.cc/DJ5S-W842]. 
 15 Seattle Budget Includes Money for Safe-Injection Site, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Nov. 21, 
2017), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/washington/articles/2017-11-21/seattle-budget-
includes-money-for-safe-injection-site [https://perma.cc/5XNQ-7WUW]. 
 16 See infra notes 52–85 and accompanying text (providing an overview of efforts to establish 
safe injection facilities). 
 17 One does not need to touch an item to possess it. A person can constructively possess con-
traband if she has the “power and intent” to exercise dominion and control over it. Henderson v. 
United States, 135 S. Ct. 1780, 1784 (2015) (“Constructive possession is established when a per-
son, though lacking such physical custody, still has the power and intent to exercise control over 
the object.”). Under this formulation, knowing presence near contraband is insufficient to establish 
constructive possession. See United States v. Richard, 696 F.2d 849, 856 (10th Cir. 1992) 
(“[M]ere proximity to illegal drugs, mere presence on the property where they are located, or mere 
association with persons who do control them, without more, is insufficient to support a finding of 
possession.”). As a result, it does not appear that safe injection site operators would be in posses-
sion of illegal drugs that were on their premises. Nor would they be likely to be accomplices to 
drug possession. Assuming arguendo that a safe injection facility facilitates the possession of a 
controlled substance, accomplice liability attaches only to those who act “with the intent of facili-
tating the offense’s commission.” Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 71 (2014). Safe injec-
tion operators do not intend to help users possess drugs; their purpose is to provide medical ser-
vices to injection drug users. See Scott Burris et al., Federalism, Policy Learning, and Local Inno-
vation in Public Health: The Case of the Supervised Injection Facility, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1089, 
1133 (2009) (“An SIF is providing a space for use of controlled substances not for its own sake or 
for profit, but in order to promote drug treatment, prevent disease, and avoid overdose mortali-
ty.”). 
 18 21 U.S.C. § 856(a) (2012). 
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employees—would almost certainly be susceptible to charges for maintain-
ing drug-involved premises.19 
The United States Department of Justice (DOJ) has not yet taken a 
formal position on safe injection facilities, but early signs suggest that the 
Trump administration is unlikely to defer to states and cities on this issue. 
The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has stated that it believes 
safe injection sites would violate the crack house statute.20 The United 
States Attorneys for the districts of Colorado, Massachusetts, and Vermont 
have announced that if safe injection sites were established in their states, 
they would consider bringing criminal charges against facility employees.21 
In August 2018, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein penned a New 
York Times editorial in opposition to safe injection sites in which he warned 
that “cities and counties should expect the Department of Justice to meet the 
opening of any injection site with swift and aggressive action.”22 Last but 
not least, shortly before this article went to press, the United States Attorney 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania filed a lawsuit against Safehouse, a 
nonprofit that has been working with the city of Philadelphia to open a safe 
                                                                                                                 
 19 See infra notes 173–277 and accompanying text (analyzing how the crack house statute 
would apply to safe injection sites). 
 20 Tony Pugh, Supervised Injection Sites Aimed at Cutting Opioid Overdoses Risk the Wrath of 
the DEA and Prosecutors, PITT. POST-GAZETTE, (Mar. 20, 2018), http://www.post-gazette.
com/news/nation/2018/03/20/Supervised-injection-sites-aimed-at-cutting-opioid-overdoses-risk-the-
wrath-of-the-DEA-and-prosecutors/stories/201803190215 [https://perma.cc/TP5K-JP7S]; see also 
Dominic Holden, The Trump Administration Says Proposed Heroin Injection Sites Could Face “Le-
gal Action,” BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 14, 2018), https://www.buzzfeed.com/dominicholden/the-
trump-administration-says-proposed-heroin-injection?utm_term=.tuAJ4jDxk#.faGGEvldP [https://
perma.cc/558K-BBJY] (quoting a Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) spokeswoman that “[s]uper-
vised injection facilities, or so-called safe injection sites, violate federal law”). 
 21 U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE DIST. OF CO., JOINT-STATEMENT OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY’S OF-
FICE AND THE DENVER FIELD OFFICE OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION REGARDING 
THE CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER’S PROPOSAL TO CREATE SUPERVISED LOCATIONS TO INJECT 
HEROIN AND OTHER ILLEGAL DRUGS (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-co/pr/joint-
statement-us-attorney-s-office-and-denver-field-office-drug-enforcement [https://perma.cc/G32H-
87DA]; U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE DIST. OF VT., STATEMENT OF THE U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE 
CONCERNING PROPOSED INJECTION SITES (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-vt/pr/
statement-us-attorney-s-office-concerning-proposed-injection-sites [https://perma.cc/P97H-FEBK]; 
Associated Press, Prosecutor: Feds Won’t Recognize Injection Sites in Mass., BOSTON.COM (July 
19, 2018), https://www.boston.com/news/local-news/2018/07/19/prosecutor-feds-wont-recognize-
injection-sites-in-mass [https://perma.cc/4N4U-ESS5] (“The top federal prosecutor in Massachu-
setts says supervised injection sites for drug users would violate U.S. law and could lead to crimi-
nal charges.”). 
 22 Rod J. Rosenstein, Fight Drug Abuse, Don’t Subsidize It, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/27/opinion/opioids-heroin-injection-sites.html [https://perma.
cc/UE9N-4EYR]. 
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injection site. Citing the crack house statute, the lawsuit seeks a declaratory 
judgment to stop Safehouse from going through with its plans.23 
To date, the debate over supervised injection facilities has largely as-
sumed that their status under federal law is clear and the only question is 
whether federal prosecutors will “turn a blind eye, as it’s largely done with 
marijuana, or bring states to court.”24 This Article raises the possibility that, 
contrary to conventional wisdom, an obscure provision of the federal Con-
trolled Substances Act (CSA) might already allow states and localities to 
establish safe injection facilities. Buried in the CSA is a provision that 
grants immunity from civil or criminal liability to “any duly authorized of-
ficer of any State, territory, political subdivision thereof, the District of Co-
lumbia, or any possession of the United States, who shall be lawfully en-
gaged in the enforcement of any law or municipal ordinance relating to con-
trolled substances.”25 This provision was likely intended to immunize state 
and local police officers that violate federal drug laws in connection with 
undercover operations. Nevertheless, the plain text of the provision, and the 
scant case law that exists interpreting it, suggests that it could shield gov-
ernment-run safe injection facilities from federal interference. Indeed, it is 
even possible that the provision could immunize a privately-run facility, if the 
operators were deputized as “duly authorized officer[s]”26 in connection 
with a state or local safe injection law. 
Although there is an extensive literature on safe injection sites in the 
fields of public health and public policy, legal academics have almost entirely 
overlooked the subject. Only a handful of articles have examined the legal 
implications of safe injection facilities.27 None have considered the immuni-
ty provision that is the focus of this Article. 
                                                                                                                 
 23 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, United States v. Safehouse, 2:19-cv-00519-GAM 
(E.D. Pa. 2019), https://www.courthousenews.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/SAFEHOUSE.
pdf [https://perma.cc/WCM2-3TXZ]; see also Bobby Allyn, U.S. Prosecutors Sue to Stop Na-
tion’s First Supervised Injection Site for Opioids, NPR (Feb. 6, 2019), https://www.npr.org/
sections/health-shots/2019/02/06/691746907/u-s-prosecutors-sue-to-stop-nation-s-first-supervised-
injection-site [https://perma.cc/ARK4-JTVP]. 
 24 The Editorial Board, Let Cities Open Safe Injection Sites, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/02/24/opinion/sunday/drugs-safe-injection-sites.html [https://perma.cc/
EWQ6-5RAJ]. 
 25 21 U.S.C. § 885(d) (2012). 
 26 Id. 
 27 Burris et al., supra note 17, at 1133 (examining safe injection sites and arguing that courts 
should adopt a narrow interpretation of the crack house statute in order to allow them to be estab-
lished in the United States); Christine Bulgozdi, Supervised Injection Facilities: Fighting the Pre-
scription Overdose Epidemic, 26 ANNALS HEALTH L. ADVANCE DIRECTIVE 118, 128–29 (2017) 
(proposing that lawmakers consider establishing a combined program of prescription drug moni-
toring and safe injection sites in order to fight overdoses, but acknowledging that federal law 
would currently block such a program); Cylas Martell-Crawford, Safe Injection Facilities: A Path 
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Part I of this Article introduces the safe injection sites in more detail. It 
includes an overview of some of the evidence that supports them and the cur-
rent efforts to establish them in the United States.28 Part II addresses the pri-
mary roadblock standing in the way of safe injection sites: the federal crack 
house statute.29 It also explains why previously proposed strategies for cir-
cumventing that law are unlikely to be successful. Part III argues that an of-
ten-overlooked provision of the Controlled Substances Act—its immunity 
provision—should allow cities and states to open government-run safe injec-
tion sites without federal interference.30 Part IV situates the looming conflict 
between cities and the federal government over safe injection sites within the 
broader debate about the future of the war on drugs.31 Part V concludes. 
I. EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH SAFE INJECTION FACILITIES  
IN THE UNITED STATES 
A. Evidence Supporting Safe Injection Facilities 
Although serious discussion of safe injection facilities is new to the 
United States, they have been operating in other countries for decades. Safe 
injection facilities are founded on the principle of harm reduction, which 
“[i]n much of the developed world . . . is recognized as one of the four pil-
lars of drug control, alongside enforcement, treatment, and prevention.”32 
Harm reduction programs are designed “to aid dependent drug users with-
out attempting to curtail their use.”33 The idea is to reduce the negative con-
sequences associated with drug use, both to the user and to the public, with-
out necessarily reducing drug use itself. Consistent with this strategy, the 
first sanctioned safe injection site, which opened in Berne, Switzerland in 
                                                                                                                           
to Legitimacy, 11 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 124, 141 (2018) (considering whether states and cities 
could raise a constitutional challenge to federal laws that block safe injection sites on the theory 
that the “DOJ’s failure to exempt safe injection facilities [from the CSA] infringes upon drug 
addict’s equal protection to treatment”). 
 28 See infra notes 32–86 and accompanying text. 
 29 See infra notes 87–172 and accompanying text. 
 30 See infra notes 173–277 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 278–297 and accompanying text. 
 32 Jonathan P. Caulkins & Peter Reuter, Dealing More Effectively and Humanely with Illegal 
Drugs, 46 CRIME & JUST. 95, 117 (2017). Harm reduction principles are not limited to the drug 
control setting but are used in connection with other activities that can carry negative health con-
sequences, such as risky sexual activity. Melissa Vallejo, Note, Safer Bathrooms in Syringe Ex-
change Programs: Injecting Progress into the Harm Reduction Movement, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 
1185, 1190 n.37 (2018). 
 33 Caulkins & Reuter, supra note 32, at 117. Although reduced drug use is not a primary goal 
of harm reduction, harm reduction policies are not necessarily incompatible with the goal of use 
reduction. Indeed, some evidence suggests that safe injection facilities can help to reduce drug use 
by serving as an entry point for users to seek addiction treatment. 
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1986, was intended to “reduc[e] the nuisance associated with public inject-
ing as well as public health problems such as HIV transmission and drug 
overdose.”34 Today, supervised injection sites are operating in sixty-six cities 
in ten different countries (Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and, of course, Switzerland).35 
Safe injection sites can differ from one another in their operational 
specifics. They “embrace[] a range of types of service[s], delivered in dif-
fering ways, targeting different populations, within different contexts.”36 
Despite these differences, supervised injection facilities share a number of 
similarities.37 At the broadest level, all supervised injection facilities are 
designed to provide a safe space to use a drug with medical personnel on 
hand.38 They also share common goals, namely to lower disease and death 
rates from drug use, decrease drug usage in public, and improve public 
amenities in high drug use areas.39 Safe injection sites do not make or dis-
tribute illegal drugs, nor do they encourage drug use. Instead, users bring 
drugs they have purchased elsewhere to use under the watch of medical per-
sonnel with hygienic instruments.40 Safe injection facility staff members, 
including trained medical personnel, are on site to intervene if there is a 
possible overdose by administering the overdose reversal drug Naloxone.41 
Supervised injection facilities often offer other services, including educa-
                                                                                                                 
 34 Garth Davies, A Critical Evaluation of the Effects of Safe Injection Facilities, 1 J. GLOBAL 
DRUG POL’Y & PRAC. 1, 1 (2007). 
 35 Kral & Davidson, supra note 2, at 919. 
 36 Mehmet Zülfü Öner, An Overview of Drug Consumption Rooms, 4 HUM. RTS. REV. 87, 92 
(2014). Indeed, although often referred to as injection sites, some facilities permit the use of drugs 
more broadly, and it is increasingly common to see them referred to as “drug consumption 
rooms.” Id. 
 37 Id. (noting that many injection facilities share “basic common elements”). For an overview 
and comparison of safe injection sites, see, for example, EBERHARD SCHATZ & MARIE NOUGIER, 
INTERNATIONAL DRUG POLICY CONSORTIUM, DRUG CONSUMPTION ROOMS EVIDENCE AND 
PRACTICE 5–6 (2012), https://www.drugsandalcohol.ie/17898/1/IDPC-Briefing-Paper_Drug-
consumption-rooms.pdf [https://perma.cc/BX6R-YUDA]; S.F. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, HARM 
REDUCTION SERVICES IN SAN FRANCISCO ISSUE BRIEF 16–20 (2017) [hereafter SAN FRANCISCO 
ISSUE BRIEF], https://www.sfdph.org/dph/files/SIStaskforce/IssueBrief-06202017.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X7CB-6NXE]. 
 38 Bulgozdi, supra note 27, at 121.  
 39Drug Consumption Rooms: An Overview of Provision and Evidence, supra note 1 (noting 
that safe injection facilities are intended to “to reduce morbidity and mortality by providing a safe 
environment for more hygienic drug use . . . [and] to reduce drug use in public and improve public 
amenity in areas surrounding urban drug markets”). 
 40 Bulgozdi, supra note 27, at 121 (noting that drug users are “under medical supervision 
using clean instruments provided by the facility”). 
 41 Id. 
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tion, equipment, and counseling.42 Many of these add-on services are stand-
ard at safe injection facilities that follow the so-called “integrated” model, 
which is the most common type of safe injection facility.43 Under the inte-
grated model, the safe injection site is one part of a broader, connected group 
of other important health and social services located in a larger facility.44 
Although there remains some debate about the overall strength of the 
empirical evidence in support of safe injection sites, a number of studies 
have found that they improve public health and safety outcomes for both 
users and the community on a range of measures. A 2014 systematic review 
of the literature that examined seventy-five studies found that the studies all 
“converged to find that [safe injection sites] were efficacious in attracting 
the most marginalized [people who inject drugs], promoting safer injecting 
conditions, enhancing access to primary health care, and reducing the over-
dose frequency.”45 The same literature review revealed that safe injection 
sites “generate public benefits such as a decrease in the number of [people] 
injecting [drugs] in public and a reduction of dropped syringes in public 
places. Contrary to what was feared, [safe injection sites] do not promote 
drug use and do not increase crime or drug trafficking or the number of 
[people who inject drugs].”46 Perhaps most notably—particularly in light of 
the current overdose crisis in the United States—the 2014 literature review 
observed that all of the studies that had evaluated overdose-induced mortali-
ty suggested that safe injection sites were effective at reducing overdose 
deaths.47 A study of the safe injection facility in Vancouver, Canada, for ex-
ample, concluded that overdose deaths in the vicinity of the facility dropped 
by 35% after it opened while the overdose rate in the city as a whole de-
creased by 9.3% during that same period.48 
A 2018 review of the evidence by the RAND Corporation likewise 
found existing studies to be encouraging but struck a much more cautious 
                                                                                                                 
 42 Öner, supra note 36, at 93 (noting that safe injection sites often provide “sterile injection 
supplies and safe disposal, education about safer drug use and communicable disease prevention, 
support, counseling, [and] referrals to health and social services”). 
 43 Id. at 94. 
 44 SAN FRANCISCO ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 37, at 21 tbl.4. The other two models of safe 
injection sites are the “specialized” model, under which the facility focuses exclusively on safe 
injection services and does not provide other services in-house, and the “mobile” model, which are 
“specially outfitted vans that provide space for 1–3 injection booths inside.” Id. 
 45 Chloé Potier et al., Supervised Injection Services: What Has Been Demonstrated? A Sys-
tematic Literature Review, 145 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 48, 48 (2014). 
 46 Id. at 65. 
 47 Id. at 62. 
 48 Brandon D.L. Marshall et al., Reduction in Overdose Mortality After the Opening of North 
America’s First Medically Supervised Safer Injection Facility: A Retrospective Population-Based 
Study, 377 LANCET 1429, 1433 (2011). 
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tone than the 2014 literature review.49 The RAND report warned against 
drawing any firm conclusions about safe injection sites because, “[o]verall, 
the scientific evidence about the effectiveness of [supervised consumption 
sites] is limited in quality and the number of locations evaluated.”50 As a 
result, the report concluded that although there is evidence that supervised 
drug consumption “reduce[s] the risk of disease transmission and other 
harms associated with unhygienic drug use practices . . . there is uncertainty 
about the size of the overall effect.”51  
B. Safe Injection Facilities as a Response to the Opioid Crisis 
While more research may be needed to reach a definitive conclusion 
about the effectiveness of safe injection sites, the available evidence is 
strong enough that a number of state and local lawmakers have begun to 
seriously consider them. Interest in bringing safe injection sites to the Unit-
ed States is not entirely new. Drug policy reform advocates have been lob-
bying for their adoption for decades, occasionally piquing the curiosity of 
local officials. In 2007, San Francisco became the first U.S. city to explore 
the issue when its public health department co-sponsored a symposium on 
Vancouver’s safe injection site.52 According to San Francisco’s director of 
HIV prevention at the time, the conference was meant to help city officials 
“figure out whether this is a way to reduce the harms and improve the 
health of our community.”53 The idea was politically untenable, however. In 
the context of the war on drugs, a safe injection site was viewed as “a form 
of giving up,”54 as an Office of National Drug Control Policy official ar-
                                                                                                                 
 49 BEAU KILMER ET AL., RAND CORPORATION, RESEARCH REPORT: CONSIDERING HEROIN-
ASSISTED TREATMENT AND SUPERVISED CONSUMPTION SITES IN THE UNITED STATES (2018), 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2600/RR2693/RAND_RR2693.
pdf [https://perma.cc/79CX-DDUS]. 
 50 Id. at x. 
 51 Id. at xi. 
 52 Lisa Leff, Associated Press, San Francisco Considers Safe-Injection Site for Drug Addicts, 
USA TODAY (Oct. 18, 2007), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/health/2007-10-18-sf-injections_
N.htm [https://perma.cc/2F7K-QXA6]. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. In an interview in 2015, one of the organizers of San Francisco’s 2007 conference said 
that the effort “just kind of crashed and burned. The country wasn’t ready for this conversation.” 
Beth Schwartzenfel, Is America Ready for Safe Injection Rooms?, VICE (Nov. 6, 2015), https://
www.vice.com/en_us/article/4wb5yb/is-america-ready-for-safe-injection-rooms-1106 [https://perma.
cc/7RFM-59GK]. In 2009, supervised injection site advocates held a similar conference in New 
York City, although this time without any backing from city officials. The New York City confer-
ence did not lead to any serious interest in safe injection facilities from local policymakers. 
psmith, Feature: Effort to Bring Safe Injection Facility to New York City Getting Underway, 
STOPTHEDRUGWAR.ORG (May 29, 2009, 11:00PM), https://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/2009/
may/29/feature_effort_bring_safe_inject [https://perma.cc/3HB7-DEW7]. 
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gued at the time, and therefore unacceptable. Even then-Mayor of San 
Francisco Gavin Newsom, known for being boldly ahead of the political 
curve on other progressive issues like marriage equality and marijuana le-
galization, declined to back the effort.55 
In the decade-or-so since the first effort to establish a supervised injec-
tion site in San Francisco fell flat, two developments have resulted in a 
dramatic shift in the political landscape: a mounting opioid epidemic and 
the abandonment of the war on drugs. First, problematic opioid use has be-
come an urgent public health crisis.56 Although the beginning of the opioid 
epidemic pre-dates this decade,57 it took on a new dimension in recent 
years. In 2010, the crisis entered a new “phase . . . [a]fter remaining rela-
tively stable for years, heroin overdose deaths spiked, tripling between 2010 
and 2015.”58 The rise in drug overdose deaths has continued: between 2015 
and 2016, drug overdose death rates rose among all age groups, ranging 
from a 29% increase for 25 to 34 year-olds to a 7% increase for those over 
65.59 In late 2017, the federal government went so far as to officially de-
clare the crisis a public health emergency.60 Prior to the federal declaration, 
a number of states had already issued their own public health emergency 
orders in response to the crisis.61 Not surprisingly, this state of affairs has 
given elected officials an incentive to think creatively about how to combat 
opioid abuse. As San Francisco Mayor London Breed put it in a 2017 report 
                                                                                                                 
 55 See C.W. Nevius, Support for Supervised Injection Is Growing, SFGATE.COM (Oct. 15, 2007), 
https://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/C-W-Nevius-Support-for-supervised-drug-2518428.php 
[https://perma.cc/KK44-6XS6] (“Asked for comment from Mayor Gavin Newsom, spokesman 
Nathan Ballard said, ‘[t]he mayor is not inclined to support this approach, which quite frankly 
may end up creating more problems than it addresses.’”). 
 56 See Beletsky, supra note 13 (arguing that the epidemic is “the worst drug-related crises in 
[U.S.] history”). 
 57 Nabarun Dasgupta et al., Opioid Crisis: No Easy Fix to Its Social and Economic Determi-
nants, 108 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 182, 182 (2018); See also Ameet Sarpatwari et al., The Opioid 
Epidemic: Fixing a Broken Pharmaceutical Market, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 463, 464–77 
(2017) (providing a brief history of the emergence of the opioid epidemic, suggesting that the 
epidemic has “roots . . . that are deeper than popular narrative suggests”). 
 58 Dasgupta, supra note 57, at 182. 
 59 HOLLY HEDEGAARD ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., DRUG OVERDOSE 
DEATHS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1999–2016 (Dec. 2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/data
briefs/db294.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3EJ-5JWS]. 
 60 Brianna Ehley, Trump Administration Extending Opioid Emergency Declaration, POLITICO 
(Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.politico.com/story/2018/01/19/trump-opioids-emergency-declaration-
extension-300590 [https://perma.cc/5WSN-BCFZ]. 
 61 James G. Hodge, Jr. et al., Redefining Public Health Emergencies: The Opioid Epidemic, 
58 JURIMETRICS 1, 3 (2017). 
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on safe injection services, “this is too big of an issue for us to rule out any 
possible solutions.”62 
Second, during roughly this same period, the political consensus in fa-
vor of the war on drugs gave way to an emerging consensus that the drug 
war strategy should be abandoned.63 Politicians from Chris Christie, the 
conservative former Republican governor of New Jersey, to Cory Booker, 
the progressive Democratic Senator from the same state, have branded the 
drug war a “failure” and called for its end.64 Both of President Barack 
Obama’s drug czars, Gil Kerlikowske and Michael Botticelli, expressed 
similar views, even going so far as to refer to the drug war in the past 
tense.65 To be sure, the developing anti-drug war consensus is not yet nearly 
as cohesive as was support for the drug war in the 1980s, 1990s, or even 
2000s, and the Trump administration has taken steps to revive the war on 
drugs.66 But political backing for a public health-oriented approach to drug 
policy has nevertheless changed the tenor of the discussion. In the context 
of the opioid epidemic, for example, the Obama administration released a 
2011 report that “broke with decades of tradition to shift the agency’s rhe-
torical focus toward a more evidence-based, proactive approach to what had 
previously been termed the ‘War on Drugs,’ and announced the agency’s 
goal of decreasing unintentional opioid deaths in the United States by 15% 
within five years.”67 At first glance, announcing a goal to reduce overdose 
deaths may not seem especially noteworthy. But the move was a genuine 
break from the strategy of the drug war, which has had a single-minded fo-
cus on “the consumption of the prohibited substance rather than any sec-
ondary consequences,”68 such as overdose deaths. 
                                                                                                                 
 62 S.F. DEP’T OF PUB. HEALTH, S.F. SAFE INJECTION SERVS. TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 5 
(2017), https://www.sfdph.org/dph/files/SIStaskforce/SIS-Task-Force-Final-Report-2017.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E56V-JFR3]. 
 63 See Kreit, supra note 10, at 1324–26 (discussing this trend). 
 64 Id. at 1325–26 (noting that Gavin Newsom and Rand Paul have made similar remarks). 
 65 Id. at 1324 (discussing Kerlikowski’s and Boticelli’s criticisms of the drug war, including 
Kerlikowski’s statement in 2011 that the administration had “ended the drug war now almost two 
years ago”). 
 66 See James Cooper, The United States, Mexico, and the War on Drugs in the Trump Admin-
istration, 25 WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 234, 281–91 (2018) (discussing the Trump 
administration’s interest in renewing the drug war). 
 67 Corey Davis et al., Action, Not Rhetoric, Needed to Reverse the Opioid Overdose Epidemic, 
45 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 20, 20 (2017). 
 68 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG CON-
TROL 9 (1992). 
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 At the federal level, the emerging drug truce has been mostly rhetori-
cal and has not resulted in much in the way of significant concrete change.69 
The story is a bit different at the local level. On issues from marijuana legal-
ization to the repeal of mandatory minimum drug sentencing laws, states 
and cities across the country have begun to translate rhetoric into real re-
form.70 In response to the opioid crisis, states and cities have enacted a 
number of harm reduction-oriented policies. As of mid-2017, forty states 
and the District of Columbia had passed a “Good Samaritan” law.71 While 
the specifics of these laws vary from state to state, they generally give im-
munity from prosecution to people who call 911 to report a drug overdose 
for specified offenses like drug possession.72 Similarly, states have enacted 
a range of laws to increase access to the anti-overdose drug Naloxone.73 
Some state and local lawmakers have also begun to give serious 
thought to more far-reaching reforms like safe injection sites that were, until 
just a few years ago, considered to be political nonstarters. Lawmakers in a 
number of states including Colorado, Massachusetts, and Vermont have dis-
cussed safe injection sites.74 They have also attracted support from influen-
                                                                                                                 
 69 Kreit, supra note 10, at 1345–49 (discussing efforts to reform federal drug laws during the 
Obama administration and their lack of success). Federal criminal justice reform efforts finally 
bore fruit at the very end of 2018, with the passage of the First Step Act. First Step Act of 2018, 
Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). Although not as far reaching as some of the failed 
legislative proposals put forward during the Obama administration, the First Step Act includes 
meaningful reforms to federal drug sentencing laws. See Erin McCarthy Holliday, President 
Trump Signs Criminal Justice Reform First Step Act into Law, JURIST.ORG (Dec. 21, 2018), 
https://www.jurist.org/news/2018/12/president-trump-signs-criminal-justice-reform-first-step-act-
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 70 Kreit, supra note 10, at 1345–46. 
 71 Drug Overdose Immunity and Good Samaritan Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEG-
ISLATURES (June 5, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/drug-overdose-
immunity-good-samaritan-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/583D-AES6]. 
 72 See Kelsey Bissonnette, Note, Anti-Death Legislation: Fighting Overdose Mortality from a 
Public Health Perspective, 23 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 451, 464–68 (2014) (providing an 
overview of Good Samaritan laws in place as of 2014). 
 73 Jing Xu et al., State Naloxone Access Laws are Associated with an Increase in the Number 
of Naloxone Prescriptions Dispensed in Retail Pharmacies, 189 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 
37, 37 (2018). State efforts to expand naloxone access have received some support from federal 
agencies. See Christopher T. Creech, Note, Increasing Access to Naloxone: Administrative Solu-
tions to the Opioid Overdose Crisis, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 517, 524–25 (2016) (outlining the limited 
federal assistance). Of course, not all state and local responses to the opioid epidemic have fol-
lowed a harm reduction strategy. In a number of states, some prosecutors have adopted a “get 
tough” approach by increasingly pursuing drug-induced homicide charges in cases of overdoses. 
See Valena E. Beety, The Overdose/Homicide Epidemic, 34 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 983, 990–91 
(2018) (providing an overview of drug-induced homicide statutes and prosecutions). 
 74 Mattie Quinn, Drug Addicts Could Soon Get Their First Safe Haven in America, GOVERN-
ING (Jan. 8, 2018), http://www.governing.com/topics/health-human-services/gov-supervised-
injection-2018.html [https://perma.cc/WVM8-FPLS]. 
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tial organizations like the American Medical Association.75 In a handful of 
cities—Denver, New York, Philadelphia, San Francisco and Seattle—
officials have gone so far as to formally outline plans to open safe injection 
facilities. In January 2017, Seattle Mayor Ed Murray and King County Ex-
ecutive Dow Constantine jointly announced that the city and county would 
partner to open two safe injection sites.76 Just one year later, the Philadelph-
ia Health Commissioner declared the city’s intent to encourage a private 
organization to open “the nation’s first supervised injection site.”77 One 
month after that, in February 2018, San Francisco officials said that their 
city would become “the first in the country” to house a safe injection site 
and that two were scheduled to open by July 1, 2018.78 In May 2018, New 
York City Mayor Bill de Blasio sent a letter to the state “asserting its inten-
tion to open four injection centers”—which would be called Overdose Pre-
vention Centers—and seeking permission from the State Department of 
Health.79 Most recently, in November 2018, the Denver City Council ap-
proved a supervised injection site to operate on a trial basis for two years, 
subject to approval from the state legislature.80 Although each of these pro-
posals was sincere and well thought out, none of them have come to fruition 
as of publication of this Article.81 
                                                                                                                 
 75 Press Release, Am. Med. Ass’n, AMA Wants New Approaches to Combat Synthetic and 
Injectable Drugs, (June 12, 2017), https://www.ama-assn.org/ama-wants-new-approaches-combat-
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 77 Gordon, supra note 14. 
 78 Knight, supra note 4. 
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TIMES (May 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/nyregion/nyc-safe-injection-sites-
heroin.html [https://perma.cc/WRH6-P5MJ]. 
 80 Blair Miller, Denver City Council Approves Supervised Injection Site Pilot, Which Still 
Needs Legislative Approval, THE DENVER CHANNEL (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.thedenver
channel.com/news/politics/denver-city-council-approves-supervised-injection-site-pilot-which-
still-needs-legislative-approval [https://perma.cc/X2KY-QRBN]. 
 81 Although there are no sanctioned safe injection sites operating openly in the United States, 
there is at least one unsanctioned safe injection site operating in secret somewhere in the country. 
Davidson & Kral, supra note 2. In addition, in an effort to combat overdoses, some syringe ex-
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them with hazardous materials disposal boxes. Vallejo, supra note 32, at 1202. Although these so-
called “safer bathrooms” are a much more modest reform than safe injection sites, they may also 
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The reason for the disconnect between words and actions is simple. 
Federal law appears to make it a crime to operate a safe injection facility. As 
a result, and as discussed in more detail below, if a city were to open a facil-
ity, its managers and employees would be at risk of being sent to federal 
prison.82 This fact has not stopped elected officials from continuing to make 
bold pronouncements about their plans for safe injection sites. In late Au-
gust 2018, for example, after California lawmakers passed a bill to author-
ize San Francisco to open up a safe injection site, Mayor London Breed told 
reporters, “I am committed to opening one of these sites here in San Fran-
cisco, no matter what it takes, because the status quo is not acceptable.”83 In 
October 2018, former Pennsylvania Governor Ed Rendell announced he had 
incorporated a nonprofit to open a safe injection site in Philadelphia. In re-
sponse to a question about the possibility of federal prosecution, Rendell 
said, “I’m the incorporator of the safe injection site nonprofit and they can 
come and arrest me first.”84 But despite statements like these, it is hard to 
imagine a safe injection site opening while the risk of federal prosecution 
looms. After all, the first mover could easily find its city employees charged 
with serious federal crimes. As Professor Scott Burris observed, while a 
number of cities have said they want to be the first to open a safe injection 
site, “my guess is that you have a lot of cities who are actually racing to be 
second.”85 
Is there a way around this impasse? The next Part examines the federal 
law that stands as the chief obstacle to safe injection sites and explains why 
it has proven to be such a difficult hurdle for cities and states to overcome.86 
                                                                                                                           
be at risk of prosecution under the crack house statute. See id. at 1205–07 (discussing application 
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applying the crack house statute to a safer bathroom is weaker than for a safe injection site, how-
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 82 See infra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 83 Keri Blakinger, Safe Injection Sites Get Green Light from California Lawmakers, THE FIX 
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[https://perma.cc/795H-6W4W]. Governor Jerry Brown vetoed the bill, citing Deputy Attorney 
General Rod Rosenstein’s threat to prosecute safe injection site operators. German Lopez, The 
Trump Administration’s Threat Against Safe Injection Sites Is Working, VOX (Oct. 2, 2018), 
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 85 Allyn, supra note 3. 
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II. THE “CRACK HOUSE” STATUTE 
The biggest legal hurdle to states and cities that want to establish safe 
injection sites is the federal crack house statute. It contains two subsections 
that make it unlawful to: 
(a)(1) knowingly open, lease, rent, use, or maintain any place, 
whether permanently or temporarily, for the purpose of manufac-
turing, distributing, or using any controlled substance; 
(a)(2) manage or control any place, whether permanently or tem-
porarily, either as an owner, lessee, agent, employee, occupant, or 
mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, profit 
from, or make available for use, with or without compensation, 
the place for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, 
distributing, or using a controlled substance.87 
Although formally titled “maintaining drug-involved premises,” the statute 
is often referred to as the crack house statute because it was passed in re-
sponse to concerns about “so-called ‘crack-houses,’ where ‘crack’, cocaine 
and other drugs are manufactured or used.”88 
The crack house statute was enacted as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1986,89 near the height of the drug war and during the moral panic 
surrounding crack cocaine.90 Though clearly inspired by concerns about 
property owners who allow their houses to be used as crack houses, the 
statute sweeps much more broadly, as early decisions applying it make 
clear. For example, in the 1991 Ninth Circuit case United States v. Tamez, 
the defendant was prosecuted under the crack house statute for drug distri-
bution that occurred at his used car dealership.91 He argued that the statute 
should not apply to his case because it “was intended only to apply to ‘crack 
                                                                                                                 
 87 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2012). 
 88 132 CONG. REC. 26,474 (1986) (excerpt of Senate Amendment No. 3034 to H.R. 5484). 
 89 See United States v. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452, 462 (10th Cir. 1992) (discussing the legisla-
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houses’ or manufacturing operations.”92 The Ninth Circuit quickly rejected 
Tamez’s theory, citing the plain language of the statute. “Although . . . the 
Congressional Record synopsis refer[s] to manufacturing and crack hous-
es,” the court explained, “the words of the statute clearly imply more ex-
pansive coverage.”93 
The statute’s reach was further expanded in the early 2000s, this time 
based on fears about teenage ecstasy use at raves.94 In 2003, Congress 
passed an amendment to the crack house statute, initially named the RAVE 
Act,95 “to cover more relationships between persons and property” than the 
original statute.96 When it was passed in 1986, the crack house statute was 
limited to permanent locations. The 2003 RAVE Act amendment extended 
the crack house statute to apply to permanent or temporary places, allowing 
it to reach indoor or outdoor venues and one-off events.97 It also added de-
claratory and injunctive relief as remedies for violations of the law.98 The 
statute has remained unchanged since the 2003 amendment. 
Federal prosecutors rarely bring charges under the crack house statute. 
In 2017, maintaining a drug-involved premise was the primary offense of 
conviction for only twenty-four defendants who received federal sentenc-
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es.99 By comparison, a total of 19,750 federal drug offenders were sen-
tenced in 2017.100 In cases when the crack house statute is employed, it ap-
pears that federal prosecutors have used it mostly to target property owners 
with close ties to the drug activities occurring on their property.101 The stat-
ute has the potential to apply to individuals with no direct connection to 
drugs, however. 
A 2013 Eighth Circuit case, United States v. Tebeau, demonstrates the 
potential reach of the crack house statute.102 James Tebeau owned 300 acres 
of land in rural Missouri that he sometimes used to hold weekend music 
festivals, with the number of attendees ranging between 3,600 and 8,000.103 
At some point, law enforcement officials became concerned that drug sales 
were taking place at Tebeau’s music festivals. They proceeded to conduct a 
year-and-half long investigation, sending undercover officers to ten festivals 
between April 2009 and August 2010 and making “more than 150 controlled 
purchases of illegal drugs including marijuana, psychedelic mushrooms, ec-
stacy [sic], cocaine, LSD, MDMA, opium, and moonshine liquor.”104 The 
undercover officers also witnessed extensive drug use at the festivals.105 
The Government charged Tebeau with maintaining a drug-involved 
premises, under subsection (a)(2) of the statute. Recall that under that pro-
vision, it is a crime to “manage or control any place whether permanently or 
temporarily, either as an owner, lessee, agent, employee, occupant, or mort-
gagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make 
available for use, with or without compensation, the place for the purpose of 
unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled sub-
                                                                                                                 
 99 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, S-
41 tbl.17 (2017). Courts applied the sentencing guideline for crack house statute convictions—
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.8—in an additional seventy-one cases. Id. 
 100 Id. at S-104 tbl.33. 
 101 See Sachdev, supra note 96, at 596 (discussing crack house statute prosecutions). The 
crack house statute’s most common use might actually be as a plea negotiation tool, rather than as 
a charge pursued by a prosecutor at trial. This is because the crack house statute is not subject to 
the mandatory minimum penalties triggered by most other federal drug offenses. Ronald Weich, 
Plea Agreements, Mandatory Minimum Penalties and the Guidelines, 1 FED. SENT’G REP. 266, 
267 (1988); see also Gerald W. Heaney, Response to William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman of the 
Sentencing Commission, 4 FED. SENT’G REP. 236, 237–38 (1992) (comparing a possible sentence 
to an offender convicted of violating the crack house statute to that of an offender who engages in 
similar conduct but is convicted of possession with intent to distribute). 
 102 United States v. Tebeau, 713 F.3d 955 (8th Cir. 2013). 
 103 Id. at 957–58. 
 104 Id. at 958. Although the court listed ecstasy and MDMA as two separate drugs, they are 
the same drug; ecstasy is one of the informal terms for MDMA (3,4 methylenedioxymethamphet-
amine). United States v. David, 681 F.3d 45, 47 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 105 David, 681 F.3d at 47. 
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stance.”106 After Tebeau’s motion to dismiss the indictment was denied, he 
pled guilty but reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion.107 
On appeal, Tebeau acknowledged that he was aware of drug sales at 
the festivals and that he oversaw a medical site on the grounds, known as 
“Safestock,” where festival-goers were treated if they overdosed.108 He ar-
gued, however, that proof that he knew others were using his property for 
the purpose of selling and using drugs was not enough to violate the statute. 
Instead, Tebeau claimed that the crack house statute “should be read to re-
quire the government to show that he had the specific intent to store, dis-
tribute, manufacture, or use drugs” on his property.109 Consistent with the 
other appellate courts that have considered this issue,110 the Eighth Circuit 
rejected Tebeau’s reading of the statute and held “that § 856(a)(2) only re-
quires that a defendant has the purpose of maintaining property where drug 
use takes place, and not that the defendant intends the drug use to occur.”111 
As a result, a “defendant may be liable if he manages or controls a building 
that others use for an illicit purpose, and he either knows of the illegal activ-
ity or remains deliberately ignorant of it.”112 
Based on decisions like Tebeau, a theoretical case against safe injec-
tion sites under the crack house statute would seem to be fairly straightfor-
ward. Safe injection facilities are a place for people to use illegal drugs in a 
supervised environment. To be sure, safe injection facilities serve a much 
different purpose than crack houses or jam band music festivals. They are 
not meant to promote recreational drug use but to serve a medical pur-
pose113 by providing counseling to people with a substance use disorder, 
preventing overdoses, and stopping the use of dirty needles.114 However, as 
noted in Tabeau, section “856(a)(2) only requires that a defendant has the 
purpose of maintaining property where drug use takes place, and not that 
                                                                                                                 
 106 21 U.S.C. § 856 (2012). 
 107 Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 957. 
 108 Id. at 958. 
 109 Id. at 958–59. 
 110 Id. at 959–60 (reviewing cases). 
 111 Id. at 960. 
 112 Id. at 961 (quoting 8th Cir. Model Crim. Jury Instr. § 6.21.856B (2011), https://www.
rid.uscourts.gov/sites/rid/files/documents/juryinstructions/otherPJI/8th%20Circuit%20Model%20
Criminal%20Jury%20Instructions.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6QL-J3FM]). 
 113 Burris et al., supra note 17, at 1133. 
 114 PHS Cmty. Servs. Soc’y v. Att’y General of Canada, [2008] B.C.S.C. 661, ¶ 136 (Can.) 
(“While users do not use Insite [a safe injection facility in Canada] to directly treat their addiction, 
they receive services and assistance at Insite which reduce the risk of overdose that is a feature of 
their illness, they avoid the risk of being infected or of infecting others by injection, and they gain 
access to counseling and consultation that may lead to abstinence and rehabilitation. All of this is 
health care.”). 
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the defendant intends the drug use to occur.”115 As a result, knowledge that 
clients are coming to the facility to use illegal drugs would likely constitute 
a violation.116 
To date, advocates for safe injection sites appear to have focused their 
energies on three different strategies for overcoming the crack house statute. 
First, if courts were to embrace a narrower construction of the crack house 
statute, it might not apply to safe injection sites.117 Second, some have sug-
gested localities consider advancing a federalism-based defense of safe in-
jection facilities.118 Finally, if federal prosecutors could be persuaded to 
adopt a non-enforcement policy with respect to safe injection sites—similar 
to the current approach to state marijuana legalization laws—then localities 
could move forward in opening them, even if they are technically illegal 
under federal law.119 Under a different administration, this last strategy 
might well be a viable option. At present, however, none of these three ap-
proaches seem likely to succeed in shielding safe injection facilities from 
federal interference. Each one is considered in turn. 
A. A Narrow Reading of the Crack House Statute 
A caveat to the above analysis of safe injection facilities and the crack 
house statute is that the Supreme Court has not yet considered the interpre-
tive argument made by the defendant in Tebeau. If the Supreme Court were 
to find that section (a)(2) of the crack house statute requires the defendant 
to maintain property with “the express purpose . . . that drug related activity 
take place,”120 safe injection site operators might well be excluded from its 
reach. Four scholars made this argument in a 2009 article that provides the 
most thorough scholarly analysis of the legal status of safe injection sites 
under federal law to date.121 They contended that the crack house statute 
should be read to require a drug-related purpose on the defendant’s part. If 
the statute were so construed, arguably it would not apply to safe injection 
site operators. This is because, “[j]ust as a hospital is operated to treat pa-
tients, not to facilitate the use of controlled substances, and a methadone 
                                                                                                                 
 115 Tebeau, 713 F.3d at 960. 
 116 United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 190 (5th Cir. 1990) (“Based on our reading of the 
statute, § 856(a)(2) is designed to apply to the person who may not have actually opened or main-
tained the place for the purpose of drug activity, but who has knowingly allowed others to engage 
in those activities by making the place ‘available for use . . . for the purpose of unlawfully’ engag-
ing in such activity.”). 
 117 See infra notes 120–125 and accompanying text. 
 118 See infra notes 126–140 and accompanying text. 
 119 See infra notes 141–170 and accompanying text. 
 120 Chen, 913 F.2d at 190. 
 121 Burris et al., supra note 17, at 1133. 
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clinic is operated to treat drug dependency, not to facilitate the use of con-
trolled substances, [a safe injection facility] is operated to reduce the indi-
vidual and social costs of drug injection, not to facilitate the use of con-
trolled substances.”122 While there is a solid case that allowing the use of 
illegal substances is not the ultimate purpose123 of a safe injection site, there 
is little reason to think that the Supreme Court will find that an illicit pur-
pose on the part of the defendant is required to violate section (a)(2) of the 
crack house statute. 
This is not an issue that has divided lower courts. Every circuit to ad-
dress the question has held “[t]he phrase ‘for the purpose,’ as used in this 
provision, references the purpose and design not of the person with the 
premises, but rather of those who are permitted to engage in drug-related 
activities there.”124 These courts have relied on both the plain language of 
the section 856(a)(2) as well as the conclusion that interpreting that provi-
sion to require purpose on the part of the defendant would render section 
856(a)(1) “superfluous” because the two provisions would then criminalize 
essentially the same conduct.125 As a result, although safe injection facilities 
might be on solid legal ground if the federal crack house statute were con-
strued more narrowly, they appear to fall squarely within its reach under the 
prevailing interpretation. 
B. The Federalism Defense 
In search of a different way around federal law, some safe injection fa-
cility advocates have floated the possibility of a federalism-based challenge 
to the crack house statute. Specifically, some commentators have suggested 
that a 2006 Supreme Court decision regarding the CSA and Oregon’s assist-
                                                                                                                 
 122 Id. at 1131. 
 123 Id. at 1133 (“Allowing drug use is not the purpose, but the means to achieve other purpos-
es—just as the ‘purpose’ of using morphine in a hospital is not the use of morphine but the relief 
of pain.”). 
 124 United States v. Wilson, 503 F.3d 195, 197–98 (2d Cir. 2007); see also Tebeau, 713 F.3d 
at 960 (collecting cases). Interestingly, circuits are split on the meaning of the crack house stat-
ute’s other provision, § 856(a)(1). All agree that in this portion of the statute, in contrast to (a)(2), 
“the phrase for the purpose of applies to the person who opens or maintains the place for the ille-
gal activity.” Chen, 913 F.2d at 190. The circuits disagree on whether the defendant’s primary 
purpose in maintaining the property must be as a place for drug activity or if it need only be a 
significant purpose, a more than incidental purpose, or something else. See Matthew P. Fitzsim-
mons, Primary, Significant, or Merely More Than Incidental: What Level of Intent Does the Fed-
eral Drug-Involved Premises Statute Really Require?, 35 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CON-
FINEMENT 177, 179–80 (2009) (discussing this circuit split). 
 125 Wilson, 503 F.3d at 198; cf. Chen, 913 F.2d at 190 (interpreting section (a)(1) as requiring 
a purpose on the part of the defendant because “any other interpretation would render § 856(a)(2) 
essentially superfluous”). 
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ed-suicide law, Gonzales v. Oregon,126 might shield safe injection facilities 
from federal prosecution.127 The theory seems to have attracted the attention 
of at least one local official: Dan Satterberg, the Prosecuting Attorney for 
King County, Washington (where Seattle is located), told a reporter in Feb-
ruary 2018 that if the Justice Department threatened to block safe injection 
sites in Seattle, “we think it will be an opportunity to convince the court that 
local public health powers are superior to criminal statutes that ban private 
drug dens run for profit.”128 Although Oregon’s physician-assisted suicide 
law and safe injection facilities both implicate federalism concerns, the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Gonzales does not stand for the principle that 
local public health powers trump federal law. 
In Gonzales, the Supreme Court struck down a rule issued by the At-
torney General that had prohibited doctors from prescribing drugs for use in 
physician-assisted suicide.129 The Attorney General’s rule rested on the 
DEA’s authority to license physicians to dispense controlled substances 
with medical uses. It provided that “using controlled substances to assist 
suicide is not a legitimate medical practice and that dispensing or prescrib-
ing them for this purpose is unlawful under the CSA.”130 The rule was in 
effect a threat to revoke the license to prescribe controlled substances (re-
ferred to in the CSA as a registration) of any doctor who prescribed them to 
assist suicide.131 The Court held that the CSA did not grant the Attorney 
General the power to regulate medical practice in this way, in an opinion 
that relied heavily on the premise that “regulation of health and safety is 
‘primarily, and historically, a matter of local concern.’”132 
If read out of context, parts of the decision in Gonzales might seem to 
suggest that the CSA gives states broad deference on matters of public 
health in all settings. The Court, for example, criticized the Attorney Gen-
eral’s interpretive rule as being based on the false “assumption that the CSA 
impliedly authorizes an Executive officer to bar a use [of a controlled sub-
                                                                                                                 
 126 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
 127 See Burris et al., supra note 17, at 1134–39 (arguing that Gonzales v. Oregon might pro-
vide a degree of legal protection to safe injection facilities). 
 128 Holden, supra note 20. Satterberg went so far as to say that “a face-off with Jeff Sessions” 
on the issue “could be a lot of fun”—a comment that likely has more to do with the electoral bene-
fits to a Seattle politician of battling the Trump administration in court than Satterberg’s view of 
the merits of his position. Id. 
 129 546 U.S. 243 (2006). The case arose in the context of the Oregon Death With Dignity Act 
(ODWDA), ORE. REV. STAT. § 127.800 et seq. (2003). 
 130 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 249. 
 131 See KENNETH BAUMGARTNER, CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES HANDBOOK, at Part 1301 
(2015) (providing an overview of the CSA’s registration provisions). 
 132 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 271 (quoting Hillsborough Cty. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc, 471 
U.S. 707, 719 (1985)). 
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stance] simply because it may be inconsistent with one reasonable under-
standing of medical practice.”133 Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court de-
scribed Oregon’s assisted suicide law—which had prompted the Attorney 
General’s order—as “an example of the state regulation of medical practice 
that the CSA presupposes”134 and discussed elements of Oregon’s law that 
some have argued compare favorably with safe injection facilities.135 
Gonzales’s deference to state and local lawmakers regarding medical 
practice would do little on its own to protect safe injection sites, however. 
The Attorney General’s physician-assisted suicide rule claimed the authority 
to dictate how the substances that are legal to distribute as medicines— 
meaning substances in Schedules II through V of the CSA—can be used.136 
As a result, the validity of the rule turned on whether the Attorney General 
had the statutory authority to determine what constitutes legitimate use of 
an approved medicine within the context of the CSA.137 Schedule I sub-
stances like heroin138 are not considered medicines at all, and they therefore 
cannot be prescribed or used in medical practice. By placing a substance in 
Schedule I, the DEA has made an “express determination that [the sub-
stance] ha[s] no accepted medical use,” which would “foreclose[] any ar-
gument about statutory coverage of drugs available by a doctor’s prescrip-
tion.”139 Moreover, application of the crack house statute to safe injection 
sites would not rest on the validity of an interpretive rule, as was the case in 
Gonzales. The crack house statute, which already accounts for places that 
are maintained for the lawful use of medicines in Schedules II and below,140 
                                                                                                                 
 133 Id. at 272–73; see id. at 270 (stating that the CSA “manifests no intent to regulate the prac-
tice of medicine generally”). 
 134 Id. at 271. 
 135 See Burris et al., supra note 17, at 1124, 1135 (arguing that “the Crack House Statute can 
only be applied to a [safe injection facility] through the sort of regulatory over-reaching by the 
federal government that the Supreme Court rejected in the Oregon Death with Dignity case” and 
the “Gonzales Court was emphatic about the limited scope of the CSA in relation to medical prac-
tice”). 
 136 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 273–74 (discussing the CSA’s scheduling process and noting that 
the Attorney General’s interpretive rule rested on a reading of the CSA’s prescription require-
ment). 
 137 Id. at 248–49 (“The question before us is whether the Controlled Substances Act allows 
the United States Attorney General to prohibit doctors from prescribing regulated drugs for use in 
physician-assisted suicide, notwithstanding a state law permitting the procedure.”). 
 138 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(c)(11) (2018). 
 139 Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 269 (distinguishing Gonzales from the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 U.S. 483 (2001), holding that the 
CSA did not recognize a medical necessity defense to the use or distribution of marijuana). 
 140 The statute begins with the proviso that it does not criminalize activity that is “authorized 
by this subchapter.” 21 U.S.C. § 856. This “is why the broad language of § 856 does not sweep in 
hospitals and doctors’ offices and the landlords that rent to them.” Burris et al., supra note 17, at 
1124. 
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does not call for a determination about the medical value of safe injection 
facilities. For these reasons, the statutory limits on the Attorney General’s 
power over the practice of medicine that was at issue in Gonzales v. Oregon 
would have no bearing on the application of the crack house statute to a 
place where Schedule I substances like heroin are being used. 
C. Non-Enforcement Policies 
Of course, as the recent experience with state marijuana legalization 
highlights, federal law only stands as a barrier to state and local drug policy 
reform if it is enforced. After spending more than a decade actively fighting 
the implementation of state medical marijuana laws, the Department of Jus-
tice (DOJ) adopted an advisory marijuana non-enforcement policy follow-
ing the passage of the first legalization laws in Colorado and Washington 
state. Under the policy, issued in late 2013 but rescinded by Attorney Gen-
eral Jeff Sessions in early 2018,141 federal prosecutors were advised not to 
use their limited resources to prosecute people who are operating in compli-
ance with state marijuana laws.142 The DOJ’s non-enforcement policy effec-
tively allowed states to implement wide-ranging marijuana legalization laws 
without federal interference.143 As a result, even though it remains a crime 
to manufacture, distribute, and even simply possess marijuana under federal 
law, nine states have legalized the possession, manufacture, and retail sale 
of marijuana144 and thousands of marijuana businesses are openly operating 
                                                                                                                 
 141 Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Att’y Gen., to all United States Attorneys, 
(Jan. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Sessions Memo], https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/102
2196/download [https://perma.cc/6FRY-GQL9]. 
 142 Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., to all United States Attorneys 
(Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Cole Memo], https://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/30520138
29132756857467.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ4H-6AQA]. 
 143 Although the non-enforcement policy has allowed states to implement legalization laws 
without active opposition, the federal ban on marijuana continues to present challenges for state 
marijuana businesses on issues ranging from banking to trademarks. See generally Julie Anderson 
Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 597 (2015) (discussing how 
federal law has resulted in a lack of access to banking services for marijuana businesses); Sam 
Kamin & Viva R. Moffat, Trademark Laundering, Useless Patents, and Other IP Challenges for 
the Marijuana Industry, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 217 (2016) (discussing intellectual property and 
marijuana law). 
 144 In 2012, Colorado and Washington were the first states to pass legalization laws, with Ore-
gon and Alaska following suit in 2014. See Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 16; ALASKA STAT. § 17.38.060 
(2015) (codifying Ballot Measure No. 2); Control and Regulation of Marijuana Act, OR. REV. STAT. 
§§ 475B.010–.395 (2015); Initiative Measure No. 502, WASH. REV. CODE § 69 (2018). California, 
Maine, Massachusetts, and Nevada all passed ballot measures legalizing marijuana in November 
2016. See Christopher Ingraham, Marijuana Wins Big on Election Night, WASH. POST (Nov. 8, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/11/08/medical-marijuana-sails-to-
victory-in-florida/ [https://perma.cc/Y252-8QYN] (reporting on the election results). In 2018, Michi-
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without any significant fear of federal prosecution.145 Some safe injection 
site advocates have expressed hope that the DOJ might take a similar ap-
proach to safe injection sites.146 
If federal officials could be persuaded to adopt a non-enforcement pol-
icy for safe injection facilities, states and cities could move forward with 
them, regardless of their legal status under federal law. At first blush, there 
would seem to be a good case for the federal government to give the same 
degree of deference to states for safe injection facilities as they have for 
marijuana legalization. Safe injection facilities are much less likely to im-
pact neighboring states or implicate federal enforcement concerns than state 
marijuana legalization laws.147 Safe injection facilities do not manufacture 
or distribute controlled substances, nor do they expressly encourage people 
to possess controlled substances. Even if safe injection sites impliedly “en-
courage and normalize heroin use,”148 as some of their critics contend, any 
conceivable impact of permitting a handful of cities to establish safe injec-
tion facilities on the market for controlled substances would be negligible in 
comparison to marijuana legalization. 
                                                                                                                           
gan voters passed a marijuana legalization ballot measure. See Kathleen Gray, Legal Marijuana in 
Michigan: What You Need to Know, DET. FREE PRESS (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.freep.com/story/
news/marijuana/2018/11/07/michigan-marijuana-results-election-legalization/1835297002/ [https://
perma.cc/A577-ZSGP] (reporting that Michigan’s marijuana legalization ballot measure passed by a 
56–44 margin). In addition to these states, Vermont and Washington, D.C. have legalized the posses-
sion and personal cultivation, although not the commercial distribution, of marijuana. See D.C. CODE 
§ 48-904.01 (2015); Jeff Smith, Vermont Now Allows Adult-Use Marijuana, but MJ Sales Not Per-
mitted, MARIJUANA BUS. DAILY (July 2, 2018), https://mjbizdaily.com/vermont-now-allows-adult-
use-marijuana-but-mj-sales-not-permitted/ [https://perma.cc/XF7L-HM7B] (describing Vermont’s 
law). 
 145 As of September 2016, in Colorado alone there were six-hundred licensed marijuana ven-
dors generating nearly $1 billion in annual sales. ROBERT A. MIKOS, MARIJUANA LAW, POLICY, 
AND AUTHORITY 4 (2017). 
 146 For example, after Philadelphia announced its intent to help facilitate the establishment of a 
safe injection facility in the city, city official Brian Abernathy told reporters, “[w]e’re confident and 
hopeful that the federal government has more important things to do than to not save people’s lives.” 
Jeremy Roebuck & Chris Palmer, Will Trump Administration, Law Enforcement Challenge Safe 
Injection Site Plans?, INQUIRER (Jan. 23, 2018), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/pennsylvania/
philadelphia/philly-safe-injection-opioids-law-enforcement-trump-sessions-police-20180123.html 
[https://perma.cc/S5DY-NKYJ]; see also The Editorial Board, supra note 24 (arguing that the 
DOJ should “turn a blind eye” to states and cities who wish to establish safe injection sites “as it’s 
largely done with marijuana” legalization laws). 
 147 In the context of marijuana enforcement, the DOJ’s non-enforcement policy identified 
eight “enforcement priorities that are particularly important to the federal government.” Cole 
Memo, supra note 142. Although federal enforcement priorities may differ for a substance like 
heroin, it is nevertheless notable that none of the priorities outlined in the Cole Memo—such as 
preventing against the enrichment of criminal enterprises, the diversion of drugs to other states, or 
the use of firearms in connection with drug trafficking—would be implicated by safe injection 
facilities. See id. 
 148 Statement of U.S. Attorney’s Office Concerning Proposed Injection Sites, supra note 21. 
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Despite a seemingly strong public policy case in favor a non-enforce-
ment policy for safe injection sites,149 it would be a surprise to see the DOJ 
take this approach. First, putting political considerations to the side for the 
moment, the marijuana non-enforcement policy was mostly a product of 
resource constraints that left the federal government effectively unable to 
block state marijuana reforms. Before adopting the non-enforcement policy, 
the DOJ spent more than a decade trying to shut down state medical mariju-
ana laws with little success.150 The federal government won a number of 
legal victories in the process—including two United States Supreme Court 
cases151 —but by 2009, it was clear that federal enforcement was not going 
to stop a significant number of medical marijuana businesses from operating 
in states that permitted them. As Professor Robert Mikos explained at the 
time, because “[o]nly 1 percent of the roughly 800,000 marijuana cases gen-
erated every year are handled by federal authorities . . . [m]ost medical ma-
rijuana users and suppliers can feel confident they will never be caught by 
the federal government.”152 Short of dramatically increasing federal mariju-
ana enforcement in legalization states, the federal government was power-
less to end state marijuana legalization.153 Rather than continuing to indis-
criminately prosecute a handful of state-legal marijuana businesses with 
little to show for it, the DOJ issued its non-enforcement policy. 
The dynamic would be much different for safe injection sites.154 The 
cities that have discussed establishing safe injection facilities appear to con-
                                                                                                                 
 149 This Article makes no claim about the advisability of prosecutorial non-enforcement poli-
cies in general, only that the arguments in favor of a non-enforcement policy for safe injection 
sites are strong in comparison to the arguments for such a non-enforcement policy for activity that 
complies with state marijuana legalization laws. For a critique of the use of non-enforcement poli-
cies in general, see Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 671, 757–59 (2014) (discussing the DOJ’s non-enforcement policy for individuals in com-
pliance with state marijuana laws). 
 150 See Alex Kreit, Reflections on Medical Marijuana Prosecutions and the Duty to Seek 
Justice, 89 U. DENV. L. REV. 1027, 1033–41 (2012) (discussing federal efforts to block state med-
ical marijuana laws between 1996 and 2012). 
 151 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483. 
 152 Robert A. Mikos, On the Limits of Supremacy: Medical Marijuana and the States’ Over-
looked Power to Legalize Federal Crime, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1421, 1424 (2009). 
 153 The DOJ acknowledged this dynamic in its non-enforcement memo by referring to the 
need for it to “us[e] its limited investigative and prosecutorial resources to address the most signif-
icant threats in the most effective, consistent, and rational way.” Cole Memo, supra note 142. 
 154 Indeed, when explaining in an interview why his office would not take the same approach 
to safe injections sites as it has to marijuana businesses, the United States Attorney for the District 
of Massachusetts Andrew Lelling pointed to resources: “What I have tried to say is what I can, 
which is I have limited resources and they’re not focused on marijuana. Right now they’re focused 
on opioids.” Deborah Becker & Chris Citorik, ‘Supervised Injection Sites Are a Terrible Idea,’ 
U.S. Attorney Lelling Says, RADIO BOS. (July 20, 2018), http://www.wbur.org/radioboston/2018/
07/20/lelling-supervised-injection-marijuana-enforcement [https://perma.cc/7RMB-J7D5]. 
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template a handful of sites at most.155 Shutting them down would be a rela-
tively easy and inexpensive proposition in comparison to contending with 
the hundreds of marijuana businesses that were operating openly in Califor-
nia by the late-2000s.156 Indeed, federal prosecutors would not even have to 
bring criminal prosecutions against safe injection sites to stop them if they 
thought doing so would be a questionable use of prosecutorial discretion 
(or, at least, a bad move politically). Under the crack house statute, prosecu-
tors could simply sue safe injection facilities to enjoin their operation.157 
Because resource constraints would not present an obstacle to blocking safe 
injection sites, the DOJ might not follow the same deferential approach that 
it has taken with respect to state marijuana legalization laws in recent years, 
even under a progressive administration. 
Second, and more important for the near future, the Trump administra-
tion’s retrograde approach to drug policy suggests it would be exceedingly 
unlikely to defer to states and cities when it comes to safe injection sites. 
During a time when politicians from across the political spectrum have de-
nounced the drug war,158 the Trump administration has largely moved to 
double down on it.159 Jeff Sessions, who served as Attorney General from 
the start of Trump’s term until late 2018, has a long history as a staunch 
supporter of the drug war. As a Senator, “Sessions spent years as one of the 
most vocal obstacles to criminal justice reform in Congress,” according to 
his former Senate colleague Sheldon Whitehouse.160 During his time as At-
torney General, Sessions rescinded an Obama-era policy that limited the use 
                                                                                                                 
 155 For example, New York’s proposal contemplates four safe injection sites. Neuman, supra 
note 79. 
 156 Roger Parloff, How Marijuana Became Legal, FORTUNE MAG. (Sept. 18, 2009), http://
archive.fortune.com/2009/09/11/magazines/fortune/medical_marijuana_legalizing.fortune/index.
htm [https://perma.cc/K3YK-TAB2] (reporting that there were an estimated 700 medical marijua-
na dispensaries openly operating in California). 
 157 21 U.S.C. § 856(e) (2012) (“Any person who violates subjection (a) of this section shall be 
subject to declaratory and injunctive remedies as set forth in section 843(f) of this title.”). Notably, 
federal officials used the strategy of seeking injunctions against early medical marijuana dispensa-
ries in California with some success. See United States v. Cannabis Cultivators Club, 5 F. Supp. 
2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (granting a preliminary injunction against a medical marijuana estab-
lishment), rev’d sub nom. United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 190 F.3d 1109 (9th 
Cir. 1999) (per curiam), rev’d, 532 U.S. 483 (2001). 
 158 See Kreit, supra note 10, at 1324–26 (discussing this trend). 
 159 See Matt Ford, Jeff Sessions Reinvigorates the Drug War, THE ATLANTIC (May 12, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/sessions-sentencing-memo/526029/ [https://
perma.cc/X2CQ-V353] (discussing Sessions’s decision to rescind an Obama-era policy that lim-
ited the use of mandatory minimum sentences in certain lower-level drug cases). 
 160 Sheldon Whitehouse, Foreword: Beyond the War on Drugs, 11 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
359, 373 (2017). 
2019] Safe Injection Sites & the Federal “Crack House” Statute 441 
of mandatory minimum penalties in lower-level drug cases.161 He did the 
same with the DOJ’s marijuana non-enforcement policy.162 With respect to 
the opioid crisis specifically, Sessions said that he thinks the only solution is 
to increase the number of prosecutions.163 Although, the DOJ has not an-
nounced a formal policy regarding safe injection sites, Deputy Attorney 
General Rod Rosenstein wrote an editorial denouncing them, and threatened 
“swift and aggressive action”164 against any city or state that opens a safe 
injection site. Even if Rosenstein’s editorial does not definitively rule out 
the possibility of the DOJ allowing individual United States Attorneys to 
decide what approach to take, as it has done with marijuana legalization 
after rescinding the non-enforcement policy, there is little reason to think 
Trump-appointed United States Attorneys would be likely to take a hands-
off approach. Indeed, the four United States Attorneys who have made pub-
lic statements about safe injection facilities have threatened to bring prose-
cutions against anyone who tries to open one,165 and, shortly before this 
article went to press, the United States Attorney for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania filed a lawsuit to block a safe injection site from opening in 
Philadelphia.166 The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), for its part, 
has also announced opposition to safe injection facilities, with a DEA 
spokesperson saying that facility operators would likely be prosecuted.167 
* * * 
In sum, safe injection facilities seem to be on very shaky ground under 
federal law. Because safe injection site operators would know that clients 
are coming to their building in order to use illegal drugs, they would almost 
certainly be guilty of maintaining a drug-involved premises under the feder-
al crack house statute. Indeed, even lower level employees could be at risk 
                                                                                                                 
 161 Alan Vinegrad, DOJ Charging and Sentencing Policies: From Civiletti to Sessions, 30 
FED. SENT’G REP. 3, 4 (2017) (discussing this development). 
 162 Sessions Memo, supra note 141. 
 163 Whitehouse, supra note 160 (“[D]uring Senate debate of the Comprehensive Addiction 
and Recovery Act, Sessions summed up his approach to the opioid crisis by saying, ‘we’re going 
to have to enhance prosecutions. There just is no other solution.’”) (citation omitted). 
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 165 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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of federal prosecution.168 Absent a change in federal law, then, the viability 
of safe injection sites would seem to depend on one of a few long-shot pos-
sibilities. Courts could reject the prevailing interpretation of the crack house 
statute, under which a facility operator does not need to act with the purpose 
of permitting drug use. States and cities could pursue novel constitutional 
claims in defense of safe injection sites169 or invite the Supreme Court to 
reconsider the extent to which the commerce power permits the federal 
government to regulate intrastate drug activity.170 Federal prosecutors could 
allow safe injection sites to move forward as a matter of prosecutorial dis-
cretion. All of these are unlikely outcomes, however. 
In the next section, I argue that there may yet be hope for safe injection 
sites in the form of a “relatively obscure provision”171 of the CSA that 
grants immunity to state and local officials who violate the CSA while en-
forcing state and local drug laws. This provision, which has been entirely 
absent from the discussion of safe injection sites and has received little at-
tention from legal academia in general,172 may very well immunize safe 
injection sites and the individuals who run them from federal prosecution. 
III. THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT’S IMMUNITY  
PROVISION AND SAFE INJECTION SITES 
A. Overview 
Buried within the Controlled Substances Act is a provision that confers 
immunity on federal, state, and local officials who commit federal crimes 
while enforcing drug laws. The statute provides, in relevant part, that “no 
                                                                                                                 
 168 See 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (liability extends to those who “manage or control any place, 
whether permanently or temporarily, either as an owner, lessee, agent, employee, occupant, or 
mortgagee”) (emphasis added); U.S. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE DIST. OF VT., supra note 21 (announc-
ing that “exposure to criminal charges would arise for . . . workers”). 
 169 In addition to a federalism-based constitutional claim, one commentator recently proposed 
defending safe injection sites on equal protection grounds, on the theory that federal opposition to 
the facilities might be “a violation of the equal protection rights of those drug addicts attempting 
to get treatment.” Martell-Crawford, supra note 27, at 141. Courts have consistently and swiftly 
rejected equal protection-based challenges to other controlled substances classifications, including 
in the medical marijuana context, however, and there is little reason to think there would be a 
different result with respect to safe injection sites. See, e.g., Untied States v. Green, 222 F. Supp. 
3d 267, 279–80 (W.D.N.Y. 2016) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to the classification of 
marijuana); United States v. Pickard, 100 F. Supp. 3d 981, 1009 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (same). 
 170 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 1 (holding that the Commerce Clause grants the federal government 
the power to criminalize the noncommercial, intrastate possession of marijuana for medical pur-
poses). 
 171 Mikos, supra note 152, at 1457. 
 172 Id. (observing that the immunity provision has mostly “escaped the attention of the legal 
academy”). 
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civil or criminal liability shall be imposed by virtue of this subchapter upon 
. . . any duly authorized officer of any State, territory, political subdivision 
thereof, the District of Columbia, or any possession of the United States, 
who shall be lawfully engaged in the enforcement of any law or municipal 
ordinance relating to controlled substances.”173 There does not appear to be 
any legislative history explaining the origins of this provision174, but it is 
reasonable to assume it was meant to protect police officers that commit 
drug crimes in the course of undercover operations.175 
Although the CSA is nearly fifty years old, there is very little case law 
interpreting its immunity provision.176 This is perhaps to be expected, since 
prosecutions of undercover police officers are exceedingly rare,177 regard-
less of the existence of a statutory grant of immunity. After all, “outside of 
extraordinary situations (such as that of the rogue official),”178 prosecutors do 
not typically bring criminal charges against police officers for overstepping 
their authority. Even without the CSA’s immunity provision, prosecutorial 
                                                                                                                 
 173 21 U.S.C. § 885(d) (2012). The Controlled Substances Act consists of two subchapters. 
The immunity provision and the criminal provisions that apply to domestic activity, including the 
crack house statute, are housed in the first subchapter. The second subchapter addresses the import 
and export of controlled substances. The immunity provision expressly limits this grant of immun-
ity based on two federal statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 2234 (2012) and 18 U.S.C. § 2235 (2012). These 
two statutes, respectively, make it a crime for an officer to willfully exceed her authority in exe-
cuting a search warrant and to maliciously procure a search warrant. 
 174 The House Report summarizing the CSA stated only that the immunity provision “ex-
empts federal officers from liability when lawfully engaged in enforcing Title II and further ex-
empts state and local officers when lawfully engaged in enforcing any law relating to controlled 
substances.” H.R. REP. NO. 91-1444 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4625. 
 175 Mikos, supra note 152, at 1458 (arguing that “the purpose of section 885(d) immunity is 
readily apparent” in that “[w]ithout it undercover agents and informants could not feel secure 
handling narcotics in the course of a drug sting; in theory, by handling the drugs, they could face 
the same charges as the drug pushers they investigate”). The statute also extends immunity to 
officials in other settings—for example, laboratory personnel who “obtain and transfer controlled 
substances for use as standards in chemical analysis.” Exemption of Law Enforcement Officials, 
21 C.F.R. § 1301.24 (2018) (“Laboratory personnel, when acting in the scope of their official 
duties, are deemed to be officials exempted by this section and within the activity described in 
section 515(d) of the Act (21 U.S.C. § 885(d)).”). 
 176 A Westlaw search conducted in September 2018 revealed just twenty-six published deci-
sions that have cited 21 U.S.C. § 885(d). 
 177 Elizabeth E. Joh, Breaking the Law to Enforce It: Undercover Police Participation in 
Crime, 62 STAN. L. REV. 155, 170 (2009) (observing that the public authority defense has not been 
“rigorously tested” because police “are seldom, if ever, prosecuted” in cases where the defense 
might be raised); Mikos, supra note 152, at 1459 (discussing the CSA’s immunity provision and 
noting that “Congress could have relied on the good sense of U.S. Attorneys not to prosecute such 
violations, but one can hardly fault Congress for wanting to codify immunity and remove any 
doubts”). 
 178 Jacqueline E. Ross, Impediments to Transnational Cooperation in Undercover Policing: A 
Comparative Study of the United States and Italy, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 569, 576 (2004). 
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discretion would almost certainly protect police officers from being prosecut-
ed for crimes they commit in the course of uncover drug operations. 
Until the early 2000s, the few cases to address the CSA’s immunity 
provision almost exclusively involved rogue officials who attempted to rely 
on it as a defense.179 In one such case that stands out for its colorful set of 
facts, United States v. Fuller, the mayor of the small town Vance, South 
Carolina, was prosecuted after being videotaped selling crack cocaine out-
side of a convenience store on four separate occasions.180 At his trial, Mayor 
Fuller admitted to selling crack cocaine at the convenience store, but he tes-
tified that he had done it as part of “a police-style undercover investigation 
into employee misconduct at Angler’s Mini-Mart.”181 Fuller claimed that he 
had not enlisted the police department in his supposed sting operation be-
cause he was unhappy with the performance of the chief of police.182 On 
appeal, the Fourth Circuit found the CSA’s immunity provision inapplicable 
on the grounds that South Carolina law did not give mayors the power to 
engage in law enforcement activity. Because “Fuller was not authorized 
under South Carolina law to engage in illegal drug transactions as part of 
his investigation,” the court reasoned, “the immunity conferred by 21 
U.S.C. § 885(d) does not apply.”183 
Cases like Fuller make clear that the CSA’s immunity provision does 
not extend to officials who act outside the bounds of state and local law. But 
they do not shed much light on how the immunity provision might apply to 
a state- or city-run safe injection site. Is the grant of immunity limited to 
officials who are engaged in the enforcement of drug prohibition laws 
                                                                                                                 
 179 See United States v. Reeves, 730 F.2d 1189, 1195 (8th Cir. 1984) (upholding the marijua-
na distribution convictions of a sheriff and deputy sheriff on the grounds that the evidence was 
sufficient to disprove their claim that their acts were “related to their law enforcement duties” and 
consequently “sanctioned by 21 U.S.C. § 885(d)”); Matje v. Leis, 571 F. Supp. 918, 929 n.3 (S.D. 
Ohio 1983) (rejecting the defendant’s effort to rely on the CSA’s immunity provision because it 
“pertains to lawful enforcement of narcotics laws” and the “evidence raises questions as to the 
lawfulness of his activities”). 
 180 United States v. Fuller, 162 F.3d 256, 257–58 (4th Cir. 1998) (noting that the case began 
when the FBI received a complaint “from the owner of Angler’s Mini-Mart in Vance, South Caro-
lina, that Vance’s mayor, Frank Fuller, was attempting to sell drugs in and around the store and 
was attempting to enlist the store’s employees to sell drugs on his behalf”). 
 181 Id. at 258. 
 182 Id. 
 183 Id. at 262; see also United States v. Cortes-Caban, 691 F.3d 1, 21 (1st Cir. 2012) (“Police 
officers who plant drugs on persons in order to create a false basis for arrest are not ‘lawfully 
engaged’ in law enforcement activities, and thus under the plain language of the [immunity] stat-
ute they may be prosecuted for distribution.”); United States v. Wright, 634 F.3d 770, 777 (5th 
Cir. 2011) (approving the trial court’s instruction based on the CSA’s immunity provision and 
upholding the defendant’s conviction where his “statutory or formal duties as a deputy sheriff and 
parish jailer did not include engaging in covert undercover narcotics investigations”). 
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through undercover work? Or, can it apply state and local drug laws that are 
in tension with the CSA? 
B. The Case for Applying the Immunity Statute to Safe Injection Sites 
On the surface, the idea of applying an immunity statute meant to fa-
cilitate undercover police stings to a safe injection site might seem far-
fetched. But a closer look reveals that government-run safe injection sites 
would have both a strong and surprisingly straightforward argument for re-
ceiving protection under the CSA’s immunity provision. The discussion that 
follows considers how the CSA’s immunity provision would apply to a gov-
ernment-run safe injection site established by a state or locality pursuant to 
a state law or municipal ordinance. The facility would be operated entirely 
by government employees whose duties and authority would be spelled out 
in the applicable state law or municipal ordinance. 
By its terms, the CSA’s immunity provision shields from prosecution 
“any duly authorized officer of any State, territory, political subdivision 
thereof, the District of Columbia, or any possession of the United States, 
who shall be lawfully engaged in the enforcement of any law or municipal 
ordinance relating to controlled substances.”184 A government-run safe in-
jection site would appear to satisfy each of these requirements. The issue 
that has caused trouble for defendants in cases like Fuller—namely, that 
they were not “duly authorized” to engage in undercover policing—would 
not present a problem for a safe injection site run by government officials. 
So long as the applicable state or local law made clear that the managers 
and employees of the safe injection site were authorized to run the facility, 
they would surely qualify as “duly authorized officer[s]”185 for purposes of 
the immunity provision.186 Likewise, a state law or city ordinance establish-
ing a government-run safe injection site would constitute a law “relating to 
controlled substances.”187 This is because the core function of a supervised 
injection facility is to provide a space for people to use controlled substanc-
es. To be sure, supervised injection facility personnel do not distribute or 
handle controlled substances. The facilities are not intended to encourage 
the use of controlled substances but rather to provide overdose prevention 
                                                                                                                 
 184 21 U.S.C. § 885(d). 
 185 Id. 
 186 In contrast, the defendant in Fuller was not entitled to rely on the immunity provision 
because, as the Mayor, he was not “authorized under South Carolina law to conduct under-cover 
drug operations.” 162 F.3d at 261. Likewise, in Wright, the Fifth Circuit held that a jailer could 
not rely on the immunity provision because his duties “did not include engaging in covert under-
cover narcotics investigations.” 634 F.3d at 777. 
 187 21 U.S.C. § 885(d). 
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and other services to drug users. But this would not leave them outside of 
the scope of the immunity provision. Because a safe injection site is a place 
for people to use controlled substances, a law or municipal ordinance gov-
erning the operation of such a site would be a law “relating to controlled 
substances.”188 Finally, the government employees working at a safe injec-
tion site would be implementing the city or state’s safe injection law and 
thus would be “lawfully engaged in the enforcement”189 of that law. As a 
result, based on the plain language of the CSA’s immunity provision, a gov-
ernment run safe injection site would have a very strong case for immunity 
from “civil or criminal liability”190 for any potentially applicable federal 
drug crime, including the crime of maintaining a drug-involved premises 
under the crack house statute.191 
The case for applying the CSA’s immunity statute to government run 
safe injection sites is also supported by a handful of court decisions that 
have applied it in the context of state medical marijuana laws. These cases, 
which like the immunity provision itself have received very little attention 
from scholars and practitioners, have mostly involved motions for the return 
of marijuana that had been seized by the police. In each of these return of 
property cases, the police seized marijuana in a state with a medical mariju-
ana law from a person who turned out to be a patient entitled to possess the 
marijuana. When the patient sought the return of their property, the police 
refused on the grounds that federal law makes it a crime to distribute mari-
juana. To resolve the dispute, courts in these cases have looked to the CSA’s 
immunity provision. To date, four published appellate decisions have in-
volved this general fact pattern.192 In all but one of these cases, the court 
held that the CSA grants immunity to a police officer who is ordered to re-
turn marijuana to a patient in compliance with state law. (The fourth case is 
discussed in the next section, along with a Ninth Circuit case that consid-
                                                                                                                 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. 
 190 Id. 
 191 The immunity provision only applies to the first subchapter of the CSA. Id. The second 
subchapter of the CSA addresses the import and export of controlled substances, and it includes 
some criminal offenses. Because safe injection sites would not be engaged in the import or export 
of controlled substances, however, they would not run afoul of the CSA’s import and export of-
fenses. 
 192 See generally State v. Okun, 296 P.3d 998 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2013); City of Garden Grove v. 
Superior Court, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d 656 (Ct. App. 2007); People v. Crouse, 388 P.3d 39 (Colo. 2017); 
State v. Kama, 39 P.3d 866 (Or. App. 2002). The appellate division of a California trial court has 
also addressed this issue in a published case, holding that the CSA’s immunity provision applies to 
“the return of marijuana ‘lawfully possessed’ under California law.” San Francisco Cty. v. Smith, 
28 Cal. App. 5th Supp. 1, 6 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 2018). 
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ered application of the immunity provision to a private individual who had 
been “deputized” to grow marijuana for the City of Oakland.) 
In the 2013 Arizona Court of Appeals case Arizona v. Okun, for exam-
ple, Valerie Okun was arrested at a Border Patrol checkpoint after an agent 
found marijuana in her car.193 Okun, a Californian, had a medical marijuana 
recommendation pursuant to California law. Although Okun was arrested at 
a border checkpoint, her case was apparently referred to local prosecutors, 
who filed drug charges against her in state court. After Okun provided evi-
dence that she was allowed to possess the marijuana under California law, 
the state dismissed its case against Okun.194 Okun filed a request for the 
seized marijuana to be returned, which the trial court granted.195 On appeal, 
the Sheriff argued that whoever returned the marijuana to Okun would be 
committing a federal crime, namely distribution of a controlled sub-
stance.196 It is worth noting here that the crime of distribution is not limited 
to the sale of a controlled substance; the act of physically handing a con-
trolled substance to someone else is considered to be distribution under the 
CSA.197 As a result, the Sheriff’s concern that it would be a federal crime to 
return Okun’s marijuana to her was well founded. Nevertheless, relying on 
the CSA’s immunity provision, the Arizona Court of Appeals upheld the 
trial court’s order. The court reasoned that even if returning the marijuana 
would constitute a federal drug crime, 21 U.S.C. § 885(d) “immunizes law 
enforcement officers such as the Sheriff from any would-be federal prosecu-
tion for complying with a court order to return Okun’s marijuana to her.”198 
The court did not elaborate on this conclusion, perhaps viewing application 
of the CSA’s immunity provision to the case to be clear-cut. 
Appellate courts in California and Oregon have reached the same con-
clusion in similar fashion. In 2002, in Oregon v. Kama, the Oregon Court of 
Appeals was the first court to address the immunity provision issue.199 In a 
four page decision spent mostly relaying the factual and procedural back-
ground of the case, the court concluded that “[e]ven assuming that returning 
                                                                                                                 
 193 Okun, 296 P.3d at 999. 
 194 Id. Arizona’s medical marijuana law includes a reciprocity provision for “visiting qualify-
ing patient[s]” like Okun. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2801(17) (2017). 
 195 Okun, 296 P.3d at 1000. 
 196 Id. at 1001; see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2012) (making it a crime “for any person knowing-
ly or intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, 
distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance”). 
 197 See United States v. Wallace, 532 F.3d 126, 129 (2d Cir. 2008) (collecting cases and hold-
ing that “the sharing of drugs, without a sale, constitutes distribution for purposes of 21 U.S.C. 
§ 841(a)”). 
 198 Okun, 296 P.3d at 1002. 
 199 Kama, 39 P.3d at 866. 
448 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:413 
the marijuana otherwise might constitute delivery of a controlled substance, 
the city does not explain—and we do not understand—why police officers 
would not be immune from any federal criminal liability that otherwise 
might arise from doing so.”200 In 2007, in City of Garden Grove v. Superior 
Court, a California appeals court similarly found that because the CSA 
“makes law enforcement personnel immune from any civil or criminal lia-
bility arising out of their handling of controlled substances as part of their 
official duties,”201 an order requiring the police to return seized marijuana 
would not put them at risk of federal criminal prosecution. 
In addition to these three return of property cases, appeals courts in Ar-
izona and California have suggested that the CSA’s immunity provision 
would shield officials from federal prosecution for issuing business licenses 
to marijuana stores (assuming that such conduct would otherwise constitute 
a federal crime).202 Both of these cases involved preemption challenges to 
state and local medical marijuana laws. In the course of finding that the 
CSA did not preempt the laws, the courts cited the CSA’s immunity provi-
sion. In the 2016 California Court of Appeals case, City of Palm Springs v. 
Luna Crest Inc., the court mentioned the immunity provision only in pass-
ing, as additional support for the proposition that the issuance of a license to 
a marijuana business would not violate federal law.203 In the Arizona case, 
an Arizona County argued that its employees would be aiding and abetting a 
federal crime if they implemented the state’s medical marijuana law and so 
the law should be struck down as preempted by the CSA. The court disa-
greed and held that, in part because of the immunity provision, Arizona’s 
medical marijuana law did not pose a positive conflict with the federal ban 
on marijuana. The County argued that the CSA’s immunity provision was 
not sufficient to protect its employees because it was “limited to law en-
forcement personnel.”204 The court disagreed, holding that “County officials 
are ‘engaged in the enforcement’ of state statutes by processing applications 
                                                                                                                 
 200 Id. at 868 (citing the CSA’s immunity provision). 
 201 City of Garden Grove, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 664. In contrast to its relatively brief analysis of 
the CSA’s immunity provision, the City of Garden Grove decision included lengthy discussions of 
standing, California’s medical marijuana laws, and preemption. 
 202 White Mountain Health Ctr., Inc. v. Maricopa Cty., 386 P.3d 416, 432 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2016) (“County officials are ‘engaged in enforcement’ of state statutes by processing applications 
for the zoning permits and promulgating regulations to permit [Medical Marijuana Dispensaries] 
pursuant to state law.”) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 885(d)); City of Palm Springs v. Luna Crest Inc., 200 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 128, 132 (Ct. App. 2016) (concluding that because of the CSA’s immunity provision 
“Luna’s premise that the City’s implementation of its permitting and testing requirements for 
medical marijuana dispensaries is in violation of federal law is . . . false”). 
 203 Luna Crest Inc., 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 132. 
 204 White Mountain Health Ctr., Inc., 386 P.3d at 431. 
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for the zoning permits and promulgating reasonable regulations to permit 
[medical marijuana dispensaries] pursuant to state law.”205 
To be sure, a handful of state court decisions can only be so helpful in 
analyzing a federal statute. But, if federal courts were to agree with the inter-
pretation of the immunity provision adopted by their state counterparts in 
these cases, government-run safe injection sites would be on very firm 
ground. With respect to application of the immunity provision, it is hard to 
imagine a basis for distinguishing a state or local official operating a safe in-
jection site from a police officer tasked with returning illegally seized mariju-
ana or a land use department employee issuing a marijuana business license. 
C. Considering Possible Counter Arguments 
Of course, not everyone agrees that the CSA’s immunity provision ap-
plies to conduct like returning illegally seized marijuana or issuing a mari-
juana business license. Three possible objections to the prevailing interpre-
tation of the immunity statute present themselves, two based on the text of 
the statute and one based on its purpose and structure. 
1. Does Implementing a Safe Injection Site Constitute “Enforcement?” 
First, one might question whether safe injection site operators (or police 
who return illegally seized marijuana or land use employees who issue mari-
juana business licenses) are “engaged in the enforcement” of a state or local 
law, as the CSA’s immunity statute requires.206 In the law enforcement set-
ting, “enforcement” typically means “to compel compliance with the law.”207 
If the word “enforcement” in the immunity statute were limited to this defi-
nition, safe injection sites might be excluded from its protection. This is 
because although the employees of government-run safe injection facilities 
would be “implementing or facilitating” the local policy,208 they would not 
be compelling anyone to comply with a law. 
A 2006 Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Rosenthal,209 provides 
some support for reading the CSA’s immunity provision this way. Rosenthal 
involved somewhat unusual facts. Not long after Californians passed the 
first modern medical marijuana law in 1996, a handful of medical marijuana 
dispensaries opened, most of them in the San Francisco bay area. When the 
                                                                                                                 
 205 Id. at 432. 
 206 21 U.S.C. § 885(d). 
 207 United States v. Rosenthal, 454 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir. 2006) (disapproved of on other 
grounds by Godoy v. Spearman, 861 F.3d 956, 968 n.6 (9th Cir. 2017)). 
 208 Id. 
 209 See generally Rosenthal, 454 F.3d 943. 
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federal government moved to shut the dispensaries down, some local elect-
ed officials began searching for ways to fight back. It was in this context 
that, in 1998, the Oakland City Council passed an ordinance to try to protect 
local medical marijuana providers from federal prosecution. Although Oak-
land’s ordinance was designed with the CSA’s immunity provision in mind, 
the city did not establish a city-run medical marijuana program. Instead, 
under the ordinance, Oakland would officially designate private marijuana 
growers and sellers as “individuals to help distribute medical cannabis to 
seriously ill persons.”210 Pursuant to the ordinance, the city deputized the 
Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative (OCBC) as “an official medical-
cannabis-provider-association.”211 OCBC’s executive director then desig-
nated a man named Ed Rosenthal “to be an agent of OCBC and to cultivate 
marijuana plants for distribution to authorized medical-cannabis users.”212 
Ed Rosenthal was eventually arrested and convicted of three federal drug 
crimes for growing marijuana.213 
On appeal, Rosenthal argued that his status under Oakland’s marijuana 
ordinance entitled him to immunity under the CSA. The Ninth Circuit disa-
greed, homing in on the word “enforcement” in the immunity provision. En-
forcement, the court wrote, “means ‘to compel compliance with the law’” and 
Rosenthal was “not compelling anyone to do or not to do anything.”214 As a 
result, the court concluded that Rosenthal’s cultivation of  “marijuana for 
medical use does not constitute ‘enforcement’ within the meaning of [the 
CSA’s immunity statute].”215 Notably, despite this holding, the Rosenthal 
court approvingly cited and distinguished the only medical marijuana re-
turn-of-property decision that had been issued at the time, Kama.216 In its 
discussion of Kama, the Ninth Circuit explained that Oregon law “mandat-
ed the return of marijuana to the individual from whom the marijuana had 
been seized, and therefore the officers in question were ‘enforcing’ the state 
law that required them to deliver the marijuana to that individual.”217 Oak-
land’s ordinance, by contrast, did not require that Rosenthal sell medical 
marijuana.218 For this reason, according to the Ninth Circuit, Kama was 
“not inconsistent with” its interpretation of the immunity provision.219 
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Although Rosenthal would certainly provide some support for inter-
preting the word “enforcement” in the CSA’s immunity statute narrowly, the 
case is at-odds with how courts have defined “enforce” in other settings. 
Courts—including the United States Supreme Court—have consistently 
recognized that “[t]he word ‘enforce’ is defined as ‘to give force to’ or to 
‘put in force: cause to take effect: give effect to.”220 Strangely, the Rosen-
thal court did not acknowledge the fact that leading dictionaries define the 
word enforce this way, nor did it attempt to distinguish or even cite any of 
the court decisions that have adopted this interpretation of the word enforce. 
Instead, the court stated without any elaboration that “enforce” means only 
“to compel compliance with the law” and that “implementing” a statute—in 
other words, giving effect to a statute—does not constitute enforcement for 
purposes of the immunity provision.221 The oversight is conspicuous 
enough that one cannot help but wonder whether the argument that enforce 
can mean to “give effect to” was simply not presented to the court. 
Indeed, limiting the definition of “enforcement” to official actions that 
“compel compliance with the law” would seem to exclude at least some 
traditional police work from the immunity provision. Consider police labor-
atories that need “to obtain and transfer controlled substances for use as 
standards in chemical analysis,” for example.222 On the basis of the CSA’s 
immunity provision, the DEA has expressly exempted this type of activity 
from the registration requirements that would normally apply to analysts 
who handle controlled substances.223 But, in contrast to testing a controlled 
substance seized from a suspect for purposes of prosecution, setting a lab’s 
chemical analysis standards does not compel anyone to comply with a drug 
law. Similarly, the police regularly display seized controlled substances at 
media press conferences. While displaying drugs to the media might pro-
mote the department’s work and send a message to other potential suspects, 
it certainly does not compel anyone to comply with the law in the sense that 
police investigations and prosecutions do. 
Adding to the mystery of Rosenthal’s narrow interpretation of the 
word “enforce” is its discussion of Kama. The police did not compel Samu-
el Kama to comply with the law by returning marijuana to him. Rather, 
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Kama presented a case of enforcing a law by putting it into effect. But the 
Ninth Circuit approvingly cited Kama anyway, distinguishing it on the 
ground that Oregon “law mandated the return of marijuana” while Oakland’s 
ordinance did “not mandate that Rosenthal manufacture marijuana.”224 This 
reasoning suggests that the court’s real objection to Ed Rosenthal’s argu-
ment was not that he was not compelling people to comply with Oakland’s 
law by growing marijuana, but that Oakland’s law did not compel Rosenthal 
to grow marijuana in the first place. In any case, based on its treatment of 
Kama, it seems that despite the Rosenthal court’s stated definition of the 
word “enforcement”, it understood the term to include at least some acts 
that give effect to a law without compelling compliance.225 
In sum, although Rosenthal could be cited for the proposition that im-
plementing a safe injection site statute does not constitute enforcement, 
there is little else to support such a constrained definition of the term. No 
other court decision appears to have limited the term “enforcement” to acts 
that compel compliance with the law. Instead, other court cases have con-
sistently recognized that “enforce” means to give effect to a law.226 Because 
operators of a government-run safe injection facility would cause the state 
or local law that establishes and regulates the facility to take effect, they 
would be engaged in enforcement under this definition. Similarly, because 
employees of a government-run safe injection site would be operating pur-
suant to a statutory mandate, they would be in the same position as the po-
lice officer from Kama, who the Rosenthal court seemed to agree was enti-
tled to immunity under the CSA. 
2. Safe Injection Sites and “Lawful” Enforcement 
A second possible objection to the application of the CSA’s immunity 
statute to safe injection sites would focus on the word “lawful.” Recall that 
the immunity provision only protects state and local officials who are “law-
fully engaged in the enforcement of any law or municipal ordinance relating 
to controlled substances.”227 There is precedent suggesting that conduct is 
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“lawful” only if it is permitted under both federal and state law.228 This 
could present a problem for immunizing safe injection site operators. Argu-
ably, because a safe injection site violates the federal crack house statute, 
the officials running the site would not be engaged in “lawful” enforcement 
and so not entitled to immunity. This interpretation of the word “lawful” 
finds support in a 2017 Colorado Supreme Court decision, People v. 
Crouse, which is the only case to hold that the CSA does not grant immuni-
ty to a police officer who is ordered to return marijuana to someone in com-
pliance with state law.229 
Crouse involved a constitutional challenge to a provision of Colora-
do’s medical marijuana law that required officers to return seized medical 
marijuana to individuals if they were eventually acquitted of the charges.230 
The dispute began when a trial court ordered the Colorado Springs Police 
Department to return marijuana to a man who had been acquitted of grow-
ing a significant amount of marijuana for medical purposes.231 The police 
appealed the order, arguing that because Colorado’s return of marijuana law 
required them to commit a federal crime—namely, distribution of marijua-
na—it was preempted by the federal CSA. By a 4–3 vote, the Colorado Su-
preme Court agreed. The court reasoned that compliance with Colorado’s 
return-of-marijuana law would “necessarily require[] noncompliance” with 
the CSA, thereby creating “a ‘positive conflict’ between [Colorado law] and 
the CSA such that the two cannot consistently stand together.”232 
Relevant here, in the process of striking down Colorado’s return of 
marijuana statute on preemption grounds, the Crouse court rejected an ar-
gument that 21 U.S.C. § 885(d) resolved the apparent conflict between state 
and federal law by immunizing officers who return seized marijuana. The 
court’s analysis of the issue turned on what it means to be “lawfully en-
gaged in the enforcement”233 of the law. The Crouse majority found that to 
be lawfully engaged in the enforcement of a state or local drug law, an offi-
cial’s actions must “compl[y] with both federal and state law.”234 Because 
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returning marijuana “necessarily requires law enforcement officials to vio-
late federal law,” the court concluded, “officers complying with that provi-
sion cannot be said to be acting ‘lawfully’ and thus are not protected by 
§ 885(d)’s exemption.”235 
The Crouse court’s analysis has some intuitive appeal and might well 
be the most natural understanding of the word “lawful” in some contexts. 
Consider, for example, a labor law that protects employees from being fired 
for their “‘lawful’ outside-of-work activities.”236 Because “the commonly 
accepted meaning of the term ‘lawful’ is ‘that which is ‘permitted by 
law,’”237 it might be reasonable to conclude that an activity that violates 
federal criminal law is necessarily “unlawful” within the meaning of such a 
statute. The same does not hold true for the CSA’s immunity provision, 
however, because it only applies to conduct that would otherwise be unlaw-
ful. A grant of immunity presupposes that a government officer has done 
something that would normally be a crime under the CSA. The only thing 
that makes that government official’s otherwise illegal conduct legal is 21 
U.S.C. § 885(d). As a result, the fact that a police officer’s conduct violates 
one of the CSA’s criminal provisions cannot possibly tell us whether her 
conduct is “permitted by law”238 within the meaning of the immunity stat-
ute. After all, every state or local official who might seek protection under 
the immunity statute—whether an undercover officer or a safe injection site 
employee—will have necessarily done something that would normally be a 
federal crime.  
The Crouse dissenters recognized this flaw in the majority’s reasoning. 
They argued that the majority’s definition of the term “lawful” was unsound 
because it did not provide a basis for distinguishing an officer who distrib-
utes marijuana as part of an undercover sting operation from one that re-
turns marijuana in accordance with the CSA’s immunity provision. In both 
situations, officers “are distributing marijuana in violation of the CSA” and 
so “defin[ing] ‘lawful’ with reference to the CSA’s prohibition on distribu-
tion of controlled substances” is unhelpful.239 Implicit in the majority’s rul-
ing, the dissent submitted, was the premise that to be “lawful,” state and 
local officials must be “carry[ing] out the purpose of the CSA.”240 But limit-
ing immunity in this way cannot be squared with the immunity provision’s 
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text, “which makes no reference to any purpose of the CSA.”241 The majori-
ty’s only response on this point was to write in a footnote, without any 
elaboration, that undercover “sting operations are ‘lawful’ enforcement and 
consistent with federal law.”242 
If the Crouse majority got it wrong, what does it mean to be “lawfully” 
engaged in the enforcement of a law related to controlled substances? The 
text and structure of the statute, which applies to state and local officers 
who are “lawfully engaged in the enforcement of any law or municipal or-
dinance relating to controlled substances,”243 provides a clear answer. The 
term “lawful” must mean that the official has been given the authority to 
enforce a law or municipal ordinance in a way that, but for the grant of au-
thority (and the existence of the immunity provision), would violate the 
CSA. The only possible source for this grant of enforcement authority is 
state or local law. This is because a state or local officer’s duties and author-
ity are determined by state and local law. With respect to grants of immuni-
ty to state and local officials, then, the term “lawfully” is given meaning by 
state and local law.244 Courts that have denied immunity under the CSA to 
rogue state and local officials have adopted exactly this interpretation.245 As 
the Fifth Circuit held in a decision denying immunity to a parish prison 
guard, the immunity statute “require[s] the application of a state’s laws to 
determine the status of the state official and the legality of the state offi-
cial’s actions.”246 Officials charged with running government safe injection 
sites would be engaged in lawful enforcement under this definition, which 
is on much more solid footing with respect to the immunity provision’s text 
and precedent than the Crouse majority’s narrow interpretation. 
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3. Legislative Intent 
Finally, one might argue against applying the CSA’s immunity provi-
sion to safe injection facilities on the grounds that doing so would be incon-
sistent with the purpose of the immunity statute and the broader goals of the 
CSA. This argument immediately runs into a seemingly insurmountable 
problem. Courts have no reason to consider congressional intent when the 
text of a statute is dispositive.247 For the reasons already discussed, the text 
of the immunity provision would plainly apply to state and local officials 
operating a government-run safe injection facility. In order to conclude oth-
erwise, a court would need to find either that the term “enforce” does not 
mean what the dictionary says it does, or that the term “lawful” is impliedly 
limited to actions that “carry[] out the purposes of the CSA.”248 Although 
there is precedent for both of these propositions, as discussed above, they 
are not possible to square with the statute’s text. 
In addition to the points already discussed, the structure of the im-
munity provision underscores the breadth of its grant of immunity to state 
and local officials. The immunity provision’s treatment of state and local 
officials is especially striking in comparison to its treatment of federal offi-
cials. With respect to federal officials, the immunity provision applies only 
to “any duly authorized Federal officer lawfully engaged in the enforcement 
of this subchapter.”249 Congress could have tied immunity for state and lo-
cal officials to federal priorities by using identical or similar language for 
the state and local immunity clause. Specifically, the immunity statute could 
have been drafted to apply only to state and local officers engaged in the 
enforcement of any law or municipal ordinance prohibiting controlled sub-
stances, any law or municipal ordinance consistent with the purposes of the 
federal Controlled Substances Act, or even any law or municipal ordinance 
not in conflict with the purposes of the Controlled Substances Act. Instead, 
the CSA’s state and local immunity clause protects officers who are “lawful-
ly engaged in the enforcement of any law or municipal ordinance relating to 
controlled substances.”250 
Similarly, if Congress had wanted to reserve immunity for state and lo-
cal officials whose enforcement furthers the purposes of the CSA, it could 
have given federal agencies oversight or control over state and local gov-
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ernment use of the immunity provision. Congress could have required the 
DEA or the DOJ to pre-clear state and local enforcement operations in order 
for the immunity provision to apply. Or it could have required state or local 
agencies to register and report their actions to the DEA, similar to the CSA’s 
registration and reporting requirements for physicians and researchers.251 
The fact that Congress did not include an oversight mechanism in the CSA’s 
immunity statute is especially telling when one considers the dynamics of 
undercover policing. Undercover police operations can risk causing harm to 
innocent third parties.252 In so-called reverse stings, illegal drugs provided 
by undercover officers sometimes reach consumers.253 For this reason, the 
Drug Enforcement Administration has adopted guidelines for undercover 
operations that involve furnishing a controlled substance.254 Nevertheless, 
many state and local agencies grant their undercover officers nearly unfet-
tered discretion with few guidelines.255 As a result, in the absence of coor-
dination with federal officials, there is always a risk that state and local un-
dercover police operations may inadvertently undermine federal drug en-
forcement efforts. Indeed, it is not entirely unheard of for undercover offic-
ers from different agencies to unexpectedly encounter and then try to arrest 
one another.256 Congress could have limited the CSA’s grant of immunity to 
make sure that state and local drug enforcement did not (wittingly or unwit-
tingly) work at cross-purposes with federal goals. Instead, Congress enacted 
an immunity statute whose text gives broad deference to state and local 
governments to decide which officials and what conduct to immunize. In 
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sum, only by engaging in a strained reading of terms like “enforcement” 
and “lawfully” and ignoring the breadth of the phrase “any law or municipal 
ordinance relating to controlled substances,” would it be possible to con-
clude there is any ambiguity about how the immunity statute should apply 
to a government-run safe injection site.257 
It bears noting here that interpreting a statute to apply more broadly 
than its drafters likely envisioned would not be at all unusual. We need look 
no further than the court decisions interpreting the crack house statute for an 
example. The legislative history of that law leaves little doubt that Congress 
enacted it with crack houses in mind. Both “the short title and the Congres-
sional record synopsis refer to crack houses.”258 The Senate summarized the 
new law as one “that ‘outlaws operation of houses or buildings, so-called 
‘crack houses’ where ‘crack,’ cocaine and other drugs are manufactured and 
used.”259 Nevertheless, courts have not limited application of the law to so-
called crack houses or even to defendants who personally act with the pur-
pose of promoting drug activity. Instead, they have adopted a much broader 
interpretation than the legislative history would suggest because “the words 
of the statute clearly imply more expansive coverage.”260 Courts should not 
hesitate to apply these same principles to the CSA’s immunity provision. 
Because the words of the immunity statute unambiguously include state or 
local officials charged with operating a government supervised injection 
facility, congressional intent is irrelevant. 
Even if a court were to find ambiguity in the immunity provision’s 
text, however, the argument that applying it to safe injection sites is incon-
sistent with congressional intent is not nearly as strong as one might as-
sume. As noted before, in contrast to the crack house statute, there does not 
appear to be any legislative history on the CSA’s immunity provision.261 It 
may be reasonable to assume lawmakers did not contemplate in 1970 that 
the statute might one day immunize a manager of a government safe injec-
tion site or a police officer returning marijuana to an acquitted defendant.262 
                                                                                                                 
 257 See 21 U.S.C. § 885(d). 
 258 Tamez, 941 F.2d at 773. 
 259 United States v. Sturmoski, 971 F.2d 452, 462 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting 132 CONG. REC. 
S13, 780 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986)). 
 260 Tamez, 941 F.2d at 773. 
 261 See supra note 174 and accompanying text. 
 262 The CSA was enacted in 1970. The first modern state medical marijuana law was not 
passed until 1996, and cities and states only recently began to seriously consider establishing safe 
injection sites. Proposals for states and cities to pass drug laws at-odds with prohibition were not 
entirely unheard of in the late 1960s and early 1970s, however. Perhaps the most notable examples 
of this were proposals for so-called heroin maintenance programs (also known as heroin-assisted 
treatment programs), which had been endorsed “by the New York County Medical Society, the 
New York Academy of Medicine, the New York State Bar Association, the New York Times, New 
 
2019] Safe Injection Sites & the Federal “Crack House” Statute 459 
But there is no legislative history that demonstrates or even suggests any 
congressional intent to limit application of the immunity provision only to 
state and local officers who are “carry[ing] out the purposes of the CSA.”263 
In fact, there is at least as much reason to think that Congress meant to give 
states and localities the broad deference that the immunity provision’s text 
suggests as there is to think that Congress intended for the provision to ap-
ply only to state and local enforcement that furthers federal goals. As the 
Supreme Court has recognized, “[t]he CSA explicitly contemplates a role 
for the States in regulating controlled substances.”264 The immunity provi-
sion itself is evidence of this fact.265 So too is the CSA’s preemption provi-
sion, which “indicates that, absent a positive conflict, none of the Act’s pro-
visions should be ‘construed as indicating an intent on the part of Congress 
to occupy the field in which the provision operates . . . to the exclusion of 
any State law on the same subject matter which would otherwise be within 
the authority of the State.”266 
Finally, even if it were possible to divine a congressional intent to ex-
clude the enforcement of state and local laws that are at-odds with the 
CSA’s goals from its immunity provision, it is far from clear that this would 
doom safe injection sites. In passing the CSA, Congress’s primary purposes 
were to combat drug abuse and trafficking.267 Safe injection sites do not 
appear to be in tension with either of these goals. With respect to the goal of 
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controlling traffic in illegal drugs, unlike the typical drug offender—or the 
typical undercover officer for that matter—safe injection facilities do not 
manufacture, distribute, or possess drugs. Here, a comparison to the rela-
tionship between the immunity provision and the medical marijuana laws at 
issue in Crouse and Rosenthal is helpful. It is clear enough that allowing the 
City of Oakland to deputize people as “officers” empowered to grow and 
sell marijuana would undermine the goal of controlling the traffic in con-
trolled substances. The same is true of requiring the police to return seized 
marijuana to an arrestee. In both cases, government officials would be plac-
ing marijuana into an “illicit channel[]”268 in the market. In contrast, safe 
injection sites are not involved in the illegal drug market in any way. They 
allow injection drug users to possess and use illegal drugs on their premises, 
but this does nothing to undermine federal efforts to control the traffic in 
illegal drugs. 
Nor are safe injection sites in conflict with the CSA’s purpose of com-
batting drug abuse. Their aim is to provide medical services to drug users 
and reduce the harms associated with drug use, not to encourage drug use. 
Indeed, the cities and states that are considering safe injection sites see them 
as part of a strategy for treating people with a substance use disorder by 
“transition[ing] . . . [them] into detox services.”269 Far from undermining 
the CSA’s goals, supervised injection sites seek to further them. To be sure, 
some safe injection site opponents argue that they will “normalize drug use 
and facilitate addiction by sending a powerful message to teenagers that the 
government thinks illegal drugs can be used safely.”270 But disagreement 
over whether safe injection sites will succeed at achieving their stated goals 
does not mean they are at-odds with the purposes of the CSA. On this point, 
it is especially important to remember that supervised injection facilities do 
not violate any of the original criminal provisions of the CSA. Injection site 
operators do not manufacture, distribute, or possess illegal drugs.271 If a city 
or state had established a supervised injection facility in 1971, the year after 
passage of the CSA, there would have been little reason to question their 
legal status under federal law. It is only because of the 1986 crack house 
statute that they violate the CSA. And, although safe injection sites may 
violate the letter of the crack house statute, they clearly fall outside of the 
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congressional purpose behind that law, which was to criminalize “so called 
‘crack houses.’”272 For these reasons, the argument that safe injection sites 
are in conflict with the CSA’s goals of combating drug abuse and traffic in 
controlled substances is not a particularly compelling one. As a result, even 
if courts were to reserve immunity under the CSA for state and local en-
forcement that does not violate the purposes of the CSA, safe injection sites 
might very well still qualify for protection. 
* * * 
The case for applying the CSA’s immunity provision to government-
run safe injection sites may not quite be open-and-shut. There is a very 
strong argument that the immunity provision’s text is unambiguous. Even if 
legislative intent is considered, the claim that immunizing safe injection 
sites undermines the purposes of the CSA is not nearly as strong as one 
might assume. On the other hand, there is some precedent in support of ap-
plying the statute more narrowly than its text would suggest—specifically, 
the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Rosenthal and the Colorado Supreme Court’s 
decision in Crouse. 
Even though the CSA’s immunity provision may not give supervised 
injection sites a certain path to federal legitimacy, it appears to be their best 
hope, at least for now. Unless and until federal officials can be convinced to 
adopt a non-enforcement policy with respect to safe injection sites, cities 
and states that hope to establish them have only a few options available. 
The proposals that have received the most attention to date—convincing 
courts to narrowly interpret the crack house statute or to defer to states on 
federalism grounds—appear to be long-shots. But there is a solid argument 
that the CSA’s immunity provision, which has so far gone entirely unno-
ticed in the public debate over safe injection sites, could allow them to go 
forward without federal interference. 
Two final caveats merit comment. First, because the immunity provi-
sion applies only to “duly authorized officer[s]” of a state or locality,273 it 
would not shield a purely privately-run safe injection site. This is especially 
notable because Philadelphia, which has gone the furthest towards estab-
lishing a safe injection facility, plans for its site(s) to be privately run.274 
Indeed, the DOJ filed suit against Safehouse, a Philadelphia nonprofit that 
has been working with the City, to stop them from opening a safe injection 
                                                                                                                 
 272 Tamez, 941 F.2d at 773 (internal citation omitted); cf. Burris et al., supra note 17, at 1117–
28 (arguing that courts should adopt a narrower interpretation of the crack house statute that 
would exclude safe injection sites from its reach based on congressional intent). 
 273 21 U.S.C. § 885(d). 
 274 Gordon, supra note 14. 
462 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:413 
site.275 Based on the above analysis, Philadelphia might be well-advised to 
reconsider its strategy in favor of opening a government-run facility or, at 
least, passing an ordinance to closely regulate safe injection sites and desig-
nating all Safehouse employees as “duly authorized officer[s]” of the city.276 
Second, in order to test whether the CSA immunizes government-run safe 
injection sites, a city or state will need to get the issue into federal court. 
Whether this can be done without putting city or state employees at risk of 
federal criminal prosecution is not entirely clear. As the DOJ’s lawsuit 
against Safehouse shows, United States Attorneys have more tools at their 
disposal than criminal enforcement; they can seek declaratory relief in ad-
vance of a site opening. But the decision to file suit against Safehouse may 
have been driven by the nonprofit’s apparent commitment to opening a safe 
injection site in the face of threats of criminal prosecution. Understandably, 
government attorneys are unlikely to sign-off on a plan that would have city 
or state employees break federal law in order to get a test case into court. As 
a result, federal prosecutors may decide it is not necessary to preemptively 
sue a city that expresses interest in opening a safe injection site, on the be-
lief that local officials will not actually go through with it. Thus, unless a 
city or state is willing to openly defy federal law, risking their employees in 
the process, they may need to sue the federal government in order to press 
the issue. To do this, they will need standing, which may be difficult to 
achieve.277 
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IV. SAFE INJECTION SITES AND THE FUTURE OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 
Only time will tell how the looming conflict between cities and the 
federal government over safe injection sites will be resolved. Regardless of 
the outcome, the relationship between the crack house statute and the effort 
to establish safe injection sites reveals a great deal about the status of the 
drug war in the United States. The beginning of this decade saw a consen-
sus begin to emerge that the war on drugs has failed.278 Prominent politi-
cians from across the political spectrum have called for an end to the war on 
drugs.279 But it is far from clear what “ending the drug war” would mean. 
This is in part because drug war critics do not appear to agree about what 
should come next. As just one example, those who have labeled the drug 
war a “failure” include politicians who vehemently oppose marijuana legal-
ization (like former New Jersey Governor Chris Christie) and those who 
strongly support it (like California Lieutenant Governor Gavin Newsom).280 
It is possible, of course, that the political winds will shift again, especially 
since the Trump administration has taken steps to revive the drug war. But, 
if support for replacing the war on drugs with a new strategy does continue 
to grow, questions regarding what the new strategy should look like will 
linger. Safe injection sites may provide a perfect test case. 
As I have argued elsewhere,281 one of things that has separated the 
U.S. war on drugs from drug prohibition in other countries is the view that 
any policy that is inconsistent with a drug-free society, even if only in ap-
pearance, is a “form[] of surrender”282 and accordingly unacceptable. The 
drug war frames prohibition as a life and death struggle in which, as 
Reagan’s Attorney General Edwin Meese put it, “there are no neutrals.”283 
Under the ideology of the drug war, ideas like safe injection sites or needle 
exchange programs are rejected out of hand.284 There is no need to debate 
the costs and benefits. In fact, the debate might itself be a concession to the 
enemy. Former drug czar William J. Bennett characterized “[b]uzzwords 
like ‘harm reduction’” as a type of surrender because they “crowd[] out 
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clear no-use messages.”285 In the drug war, there can be no allowance for 
states and cities to tryout harm reduction policies to gather evidence about 
what works and what does not. The only acceptable measures are those that 
take a zero-tolerance approach to drug use. 
This outlook led Congress to pass increasingly punitive and far-
reaching anti-drug legislation in the 1980s, the crack house statute being a 
prime example. The law had no connection to any significant federal en-
forcement interest and was largely unnecessary in any event. Crack houses 
are essentially a land use concern; they are blighted properties that happen 
to involve drug activity rather than some other type of nuisance. To the ex-
tent that crack houses contribute to the drug trade, Congress did not need to 
pass a new law to address the problem. The great majority of people who 
maintain a place for the purpose of manufacturing, selling, or using drugs 
are guilty of other federal drug crimes—namely manufacturing, distrib-
uting, or possessing drugs—either as a principal or an accomplice.286 A law 
like the crack house statute is not necessary to prosecute drug manufactur-
ers or sellers, or even landlords who rent their property to drug dealers at a 
premium. Nevertheless, Congress created a new crime to address the prob-
lem of crack houses and wrote the statute so broadly that it applies to a per-
son who knows someone is using her property for a prohibited purpose, 
even if she does not share that purpose.287 As a result, the statute sweeps in 
people with a tenuous connection to the drug trade who would be guilty of 
no crime under traditional accomplice liability principles288 including, very 
likely, government-run safe injection sites. 
If calls to end the drug war are ever going to move beyond rhetoric, 
federal lawmakers must reconsider laws like the crack house statute and 
give cities and states room to experiment with policies like safe injection 
facilities. The war on drugs may require a uniformity of purpose among 
federal, state, and local laws. But a drug policy that is focused on public 
health can allow—and, indeed, should encourage—innovation and a diver-
sity of approaches.289 If we are no longer fixated on achieving a drug-free 
society, there is no reason to insist that all state and local drug laws be di-
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rected exclusively, or even primarily, toward use reduction. Instead, cities 
and states should have the space to try out new policies that prioritize goals 
like harm reduction over concerns about sending a message of permissive-
ness. The federal government has already recognized as much when it 
comes to state marijuana legalization laws, albeit somewhat reluctantly. 
Through its (formal and now informal) non-enforcement policy and a con-
gressional budget rider that shields state medical marijuana businesses from 
prosecution,290 the federal government has let states try new approaches to 
marijuana policy. 
The argument for deferring to states and cities is even stronger when it 
comes to policies like supervised injection sites that do not implicate federal 
or cross-state concerns. In contrast to the legal manufacture and sale of ma-
rijuana, which has the potential to impact neighboring states,291 the effects 
of safe injection sites are almost entirely limited to the city (even more like-
ly, just the neighborhood) where they are located.292 They neither distribute 
nor purchase drugs, nor do they promote drug use. Any conceivable influ-
ence they might have on the demand for illegal drugs would be negligible. 
Not surprisingly, then, federal opposition to letting states and cities test safe 
injection sites appears to be premised on a belief that they are incompatible 
with the war on drugs strategy. As Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein 
recently put it, instead of opening supervised injection sites, cities and states 
“should join [the federal government] and fight drug abuse.”293 In Rosen-
stein’s view, the “fight” is waged by “aggressively prosecut[ing] criminals 
who supply the deadly poison,”294 and the only acceptable goal is reducing 
drug use. Safe injection sites, which are designed to reduce harm among 
users (rather than use itself), are seen as little more than a way to “help peo-
ple abuse drugs by providing needles [with staff] stand[ing] ready to resus-
citate addicts who overdose.”295 There is no serious claim that safe injection 
sites would contribute to the market for illegal drugs or have any real effect 
outside of the cities in which they would operate. But, among drug warriors, 
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they are a federal concern because they would “normalize drug use” and 
send the wrong “message to teenagers.”296 
For this reason, the movement to establish safe injection sites raises 
fundamental questions about our national approach to drug policy. Should 
we return to the strategy of the drug war, with every level of government 
marching in lockstep toward the elusive goal of a drug free society? Or 
should we continue moving toward a public health strategy, with a focus on 
trying out new policies and gathering evidence to determine what works? 
As cities and states continue their effort to establish safe injection sites, fed-
eral officials will be forced to wrestle with these questions. This includes 
courts that, in the words of Justice John Paul Stevens, acted mostly as “loy-
al foot soldier[s]”297 in the war on drugs. If judges view the CSA’s immuni-
ty provision through the lens of the drug war, they will be much more will-
ing to read it narrowly and exclude harm reduction measures that conflict 
with a zero-tolerance approach from its reach.  
More important than the courts when it comes to the future of federal 
drug policy, however, is Congress. So far, Congress has been absent from 
the debate over supervised injection sites. People on both sides of the issue 
have been operating on the assumption that federal law will remain as it is. 
From the perspective of safe injection site advocates and opponents, this 
makes some sense. In light of Congress’s failure to resolve the much more 
pressing conflict between federal and state marijuana laws, it seems unlike-
ly that federal lawmakers would take up the issue of safe injection sites 
now. But if interest in safe injection sites continues to grow at the state and 
local level, it will only be a matter of time before the issue reaches Con-
gress. 
CONCLUSION 
Safe injection sites are currently operating in ten countries, including 
Canada. There is a good deal of evidence that they can reduce overdose 
deaths and the spread of blood-borne diseases among injection drug users. 
Only recently have they begun to receive serious attention from policymak-
ers in the United States, however. For years, harm reduction measures like 
safe injection sites were rejected out-of-hand on the grounds that they were 
incompatible with the war on drugs. Somewhat suddenly, the landscape has 
changed. Waning enthusiasm for the drug war, coupled with the opioid cri-
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sis, have led a number of cities and states to take concrete steps toward es-
tablishing safe injection sites. A few cities have even held press conferences 
to announce their plans to open the first safe injection site in the United 
States. But, so far, none of these efforts has moved beyond the planning 
stage because federal law stands in the way. The federal crack house statute 
makes it a crime to maintain a building for the purpose of using a controlled 
substance. Safe injection sites almost surely violate that law. 
This Article proposes a novel solution to the conflict between cities 
and the federal government over safe injection sites in the form of an ob-
scure provision of the Controlled Substances Act that immunizes officials 
who are engaged in the enforcement of state and local laws relating to con-
trolled substances. Although the CSA’s immunity provision was likely writ-
ten with undercover police officers in mind, the plain language of the law 
seems to apply to a government-run safe injection site. A handful of courts 
have already relied on the statute to immunize government officials who 
were engaged in the enforcement of state medical marijuana laws. The logic 
of those decisions supports immunizing the operators of government-run 
safe injection sites. To be sure, there is other precedent that points toward a 
narrower reading of the immunity provision, so the case for applying it to 
safe injection sites is not open-and-shut. But if courts were to agree with the 
interpretation of the immunity provision outlined in this Article, cities 
would be free to open safe injection sites without putting their employees at 
risk of federal prosecution. 
Even if the threat of federal prosecution were removed for safe injec-
tion site operators, other challenges would remain. Most notably, the federal 
government could try to interfere with the operation of safe injection sites 
by targeting users for arrest and prosecution. Although simple drug posses-
sion is rarely prosecuted in federal court, it is a federal crime.298 A grant of 
immunity to safe injection site employees would not prevent Drug En-
forcement Administration agents from “camp[ing] out in front of the site 
and arrest[ing] anyone in possession” of drugs.299 Whether a strategy like 
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this would succeed in effectively blocking the implementation of safe injec-
tion sites is far from clear, however.300 Still, the prospect of the federal gov-
ernment arresting and prosecuting safe injection site clients would at the 
very least present another problem for cities and states to consider. 
Whether cities and states will succeed in their efforts to establish safe 
injection sites in the face of federal opposition remains to be seen. Safe in-
jection site advocates are understandably focused on how this conflict will 
impact the opioid crisis. But the outcome will also say a lot about the state 
of drug policy in the United States more broadly. United States drug policy 
appears to stand at a crossroads. Throughout the Obama administration, the 
country seemed to be moving slowly but steadily toward an end to the war 
on drugs. Well-known politicians from both parties denounced the drug war 
as a failure. The Trump administration has worked to “reverse”301 this trend, 
however. Under Attorney General Sessions, the DOJ withdrew the modest 
limits that the Obama administration had placed on applying mandatory 
minimum penalties to low-level drug offenders. Sessions also rescinded the 
DOJ’s policy of non-enforcement against people who comply with state 
marijuana laws, although that move has not had much practical effect. In a 
sign that the federal government has given up the fight over marijuana le-
galization, it has continued to take a hands-off approach when it comes to 
state marijuana legalization laws. By all appearances, the next battle be-
tween state and federal drug laws will concern safe injection sites. The re-
sult may tell us whether the United States is willing to put an end to the war 
on drugs or merely to the war on marijuana. 
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